20:25, 12 August 2009
By James Rogers
This new map has recently been produced and published on the website of the Council of the European Union:
It charts every European civilian mission and military operation since 2003. What is interesting is that the missions and operations have slowly spread outwards from the Western Balkans, which was the initial birthplace of the European Security and Defence Policy.
Clearly, as the European Union’s confidence as an international power and security actor has grown, it has gradually extended its geostrategic reach deeper into Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.
At this rate, I wonder how the map will look in 2019? If the world order takes a turn for the worse, and if the Treaty of Lisbon comes into effect – with all its provisions for the enhancement of the European Union’s foreign, security and defence policies – I suspect the map will be literally covered, possibly with even a few operations in Central and Southeast Asia!
One question posed by this visualisation of ESDP operations is whether it illustrates evidence of a coherent strategy governing deployments or whether it is serendipity at work?
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Good point, Richard! I thought about this before I posted the article, and chose for the title ‘geopolitical footprint’ rather than ‘geostrategic footprint’, as I thought the latter would imply too much that a (geo)strategy actually was at work. But I suspect that – as with most things – it is a combination of both, and also relates to the Union’s strategic objectives. I think a strong argument could be made for the initial existence of a ‘coherent (geo)strategy’, particularly with the operations in the Balkans. I also think we’re slowly moving in a more (geo)strategically-oriented direction, especially given the recent naval operation off Somalia (which is surely of a different order than past operations). Those in continental Africa were not really geostrategic in any sense of the word, but were ‘strategic’ in the sense of meeting some of the Union’s objectives, as laid out in the European Security Strategy. I hope that answers your question.
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This is the type of exercise in puffing the role of the CFSP which is simply counter-productive. Apart from the inordinate use of acronyms, to which the military mind is especially prone, the various missions vary enormously in size and importance and some would hardly warrant a mention in the context of the development aid activities of the EU, by way of example.
Why not put an approximate cost – both to the EU and the contributing Member States – beside each one to give some idea of scale?
The terms ‘geopolitical’ or ‘geostrategic’ are equally meaningless.
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DOCM: I don’t think anyone is puffing up the role of the CFSP. The range of missions speaks for itself. While some of them have been small, others have been larger; the recent operation off the coast of Somalia being a case in point. And given that the EU is still finding its feet in this area, the record has not been too bad, even if it could have been a lot better.
I did not make the map, although I agree that it would have been useful to see cost comparisons for the different missions.
I disagree that the concepts ‘geopolitical’ or ‘geostrategic’ are meaningless. It would have been nice for you to explain why, but I’m assuming you’re conflating them with Great Power status. If that is the case, I disagree; as concepts they are not indicative of power or size. Even a relatively small country could still have either a geopolitical or geostrategic footprint.
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Without wishing to cause offence, I have to stick with my descriptions, both of the map itself (for which you are, of course, not responsible) and the words that you use to describe it.
Both suggest that the EU is, in some way, projecting ‘hard power’ outside its borders. (This is the only sense that I, personally, can attach to the terms ‘geo-political’ or ‘geo-strategic’.)
This is neither the stated objective of the CFSP or the intention of its participants, with one possible exception: France.
The vast majority of Member States are also members of NATO, including the six largest, and any heavy security lifting takes place in that context. The debate that takes place with regard to the CFSP, on the other hand, often seems to take place in a parallel universe that ignores this reality.
This would not matter greatly were it not for the fact that this approach is beginning to create real confusion in public opinion and a ‘conflation’ of the reasons why, by way of example, Germany has (very reluctantly) committed troops to Afganistan.
I am not attacking the concept of the CFSP. But I would argue strongly for situating it correctly in an appropriate context. An example of how this might be done would be to have a map setting out the totality of the EU’s involvement – aid, etc. – with a particular country within which a CFSP operation might be taking – or have taken – place.
This is the approach that should recommend itself to the new ‘double-hatted’ High Representative to be appointed under the Lisbon Treaty and which, I assume, is also one of the reasons why the post was created.
Incidentally, a recognised puffing technique in the property business is to list not only the properties that are for sale but also those that have already been sold.
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DCOM: Thanks for your comment. You are of course entitled to your opinion, but may I remind you that this is not a geographical depiction of CFSP, but rather of ESDP. There is a difference. Nonetheless, I would also find a map of CFSP – along the lines you suggest – of interest. I’ll keep my eyes peeled for one.
However, I do not accept your contention that only France wishes to use CFSP/ESDP to project ‘hard power’ outside the borders of the European Union. I think a number of Member States have this as their ultimate objective too – even the United Kingdom. Remember that in the Laeken Declaration, all Member States committed themselves to the gradual but progressive transformation of the EU from an international actor into a global power:
Speaking as someone from the post-Cold War generation, I have no particular affinity for NATO. As geopolitical plates move in East Asia with China and India’s rise, the United States will inevitably concentrate its resources in that region, leaving us to look after ourselves (it has already reinforced some of its naval stations around the Pacific). The EU will gain a life of its own under these circumstances, and the groundwork – no matter how insignificant in the grand scheme of things today – will have already been laid.
Finally, I do not disagree with your suggestion for the role of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, it is precisely this comprehensive role that he or she is projected to play. But a comprehensive approach must also include a military dimension – and one befitting an economic and political union with the world’s largest economy and a population of nearly half a billion people…
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As you say, everyone is entitled to their opinion. I can only comment that there are quite a few capitals that would find your view of what they have agreed to rather a shock.
As to the difference between the CFSP and the ESDP, which is to become the CSDP, this is part of the alphabet soup that creates more confusion than light e.g. the first sentence of Article 42.1 TEU Lisbon ‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy’.
Indeed, as the ESDP elements of the cost of the CFSP largely falls to the Member States, it is hard to even describe it as an EU policy. (‘Costs fall where they lie’ or is the other way round?).
The harsh reality is that the entire policy in this area is designed to paper over a fundamental difference of opinion within the Alliance as to the degree of independent action that is to be allowed to the European members of the Alliance with the majority – led by the UK – on the side of leaving leadership with Washington the minority – led by France – taking the opposite view.
My concern is that the context for this dispute will shift to the wrong forum viz. the EU.
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DOCM: Yes, you’re quite right about the alphabet soup. And yes, you are also accurate in stating that C/ESDP is a component of CFSP (I could have been clearer earlier). But the point about the map still holds – it shows ESDP, not CFSP.
The question as to whether or not the European Union should assume more military tasks is an important one, but will not be dictated by London or any other European capital. It will be dictated by the simple fact that geopolitics in Asia is changing, and that American power will be pulled into that region. It is very similar to the situation facing Britain in the early twentieth century. As German naval power grew in the North Sea, British resources were withdrawn from East Asia; an alliance was formed with the Japanese to help keep Russia from making advances in the region; and British warships were concentrated in Scapa Flow.
Likewise, as China and India rise, American resources will be concentrated in South East Asia and East Asia. But long before then, Europeans – and the British particularly – will have to rethink their longer term strategy. With American power in Europe falling by the wayside, the European Union is the logical platform to fill the void. And given that, in less than a decade, the United Kingdom and France will be the two most populous Member States, they will get a significant say in how this all takes shape.
So any forward looking person should understand that binding London and Paris together, and linking them to the others through the European Union, will be the decisive project of our age – not only for the maintenance of peace and prosperity within our own continent, but also to ensure that we do not become pawns in a potentially dangerous world.
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I do not find that the narrative you are defending corresponds to any kind of reality. The quotation you used earlier from the Laeken Declaration did not find application in the Constitutional Treaty and certainly not in the Lisbon Treaty.
Rather than simply bat the ball back and forth, I suggest that we use as a basis for discussion the essential document of reference in the matter which is, I think, the report produced by the House of Lords on the Lisbon Treaty (N.B. 300 pages and 5mb).
The report is quite outstanding both in terms of its coverage, the evidence taken and in the pragmatic and realistic nature of its conclusions. If it has not received wider dissemination within the academic community, it fully deserves to.
Insofar as there is any real desire to project power (and the out-of-area activities of NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan are not a reassuring omen), it is likely to take place through Permanent Structured Cooperation cf. in particular evidence of the Minister for Europe at pages S81 and S82 of Volume II: (Evidence).
And the idea that the US intends ceding influence in any part of the globe is one that I cannot share. That it might wish to get its allies to carry more of the burden, yes. But control, never.
Have a good weekend.
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I can see I’m not going to convince you anytime soon. You are right to state that the citation from the Laeken Declaration I used found no linguistic expression in the Treaty of Lisbon or the failed Constitutional Treaty. But that is not really the point. The reforms in both of those treaties very clearly focus on providing better institutional machinery for the execution of European foreign and security policy. This was very clearly also the intention of many of the two treaties’ founders. As Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said in 2002 when he opened the European Convention:
Indeed, given that you imply that the possibility for power projection will exist under permanent structured cooperation, my arguments are well within the confines of reality. In any case, projecting power is a very subjective notion. I think the European Union has been projecting power for quite some time: the eleven warships off the coast of Somalia are a testament to that. I grant you that some of the European missions have been very small, but they are still projecting European power abroad.
As for your comments about the United States, you are absolutely right. Of course Washington does not want to give up control. But that is not the point. The point is that Washington will be forced to do so, as a multipolar world (dis)order takes hold. You surely don’t think that the international status-quo will remain forever, do you? Even the US government seems to understand that the period of unipolarity is coming to an end. See, for example, the latest twenty year projection from the Central Intelligence Agency. As it says, on page nine:
Have a nice weekend too!
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I have just seen an article by Charles Grant that will appear in tomorrow’s Financial Times which rather coincidentally sums up both my reasoning and conclusions: except in one respect. He suggests that the countries of like mind should set up, in effect, a permanent structured cooperation outside the EU.
The title of the piece is, appropriately enough, How to make Europe’s military work.
The reason I would disagree in relation to the point mentioned above is that, apart from the initial decision by QMV of the Council to actually set it up, the proposed form of permanent structured cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty ceases thereafter to have any further decision-making link with the institutions of the EU, i.e. it is not necessary to go outside the EU to achieve the result desired by Mr. Grant.
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Thank you DOCM for pointing me to Charles Grant’s article; I have just read it. If you agree with the thrust of that, then we are probably arguing about very little. I agree with its general reasoning – and I agree vis-à-vis your point about permanent structured cooperation.
It would seem then, that the only things we disagree on are:
(1) I think the EU has projected power, albeit in a way that is very limited.
(2) A strategic culture has slowly begun to emerge at the European level, which is certainly more activist than in the past, but still has a long way to go in order to reach anything approximating the ambitions of those supporting a stronger security and defence policy (like me).
(3) You seem to want the EU to remain a civilian power, although I have possibly misread you. Obviously, I do not want it to remain a civilian power. If we are to count for anything in the twenty-first century, we have to have access to full-instrumental power and be willing to use it.
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1. Agreed. (I never denied it).
2. I do not agree. It would only be true when ‘geostrategic’ is redefined to be something on the lines of ‘better coordination of all the external relations instruments availabe to the EU in which CFSP/CSDP plays its appropriate role’.
3. For an academic blog in particular, personal likes and dislikes do not come into it. My point throughout has been that there is no majority impetus within the EU for the development which you personally happen to consider desirable. The facts, in my view bear me out.
I think we can leave it at that.
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Grand. I am glad you have taken the opportunity to share your views; your thoughts will always be welcome in this forum.
However, I would just like to finish by stating that I do not think this debate is incompatible with personal views, insofar as they can ever be disentailed from ‘academic discussion’, particularly in a political subject like European studies. Academic research will always have a political consequence of some kind, contributing (in whatever small way), in this case, to the shaping of the European Union as an international actor (and changes in its foreign, security and defence policies). And in any case, commentary, opinion and informed discussion is completely compatible with the aims of Ideas on Europe, as asserted by the site’s own guidelines.
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