European Geostrategy

1:01, 21 August 2009

By Luis Simón

Over a month ago, the United States and Russia agreed in Moscow to further reductions in strategic nuclear weaponry amidst speculation of a new dawn in Russian-American relations. It might still be too soon to tell if the unfolding Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are an isolated event, a mere by-product of the 2008 financial crunch, or whether they carry a deeper strategic meaning. To be sure, President Obama’s ‘reset-button’ overtures towards Russia have already raised many eyebrows. Others have interpreted Mr. Obama reaching out to the Russians merely as  standard protocol, something mandatory to every new administration and unlikely to go much beyond the cosmetic realm.

Yet in reality, the chitter-chatter over American-Russian relations is beside the point. What matters is that any sign of rapprochement between the two sends real chills down many a spine in Central and Eastern Europe. And understandably so: it was America’s standing up to a weakening Russia in the 1980s and 1990s that gave Central and Eastern Europeans a new leash of life. While ongoing distrust between Moscow and Washington may hinder a new partnership, the likelihood of an eventual improvement should not be so easily ruled out. It might actually make good strategic sense for both parties. Europeans in particular would do well to keep an eye on such a possibility and accordingly, do so some contingency thinking themselves.

In the short term, the prospects for improved Russian-American relations look bleak. While many hope that the Kremlin’s supposed hand could reign in Iran – and help the Allies in Afghanistan – serious issues prevent a meeting of minds in either Washington or Moscow. As of today, Russia not only remains the main great power contester to American hegemony in the Middle East, it is also a major player in Central Asia.

Moscow gives Tehran’s nuclear adventure appropriate UN Security Council cover and assists it with key military technology – like air defence systems. In turn, Iran and its wide range of proxies (e.g. in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine) remain a major obstacle to American primacy in the Middle East. Russia’s role in Iran isn’t just about leverage but, more importantly, is also about maintaining what’s left of a balance of power in the Middle East. It goes without saying that Moscow is not going to trade this away so easily.

Similar dynamics operate in the case of Afghanistan. Here, it is said that Moscow’s blessing would result in important logistical advantages for the Allied effort in this Central Asian country, insofar as Russia controls – either directly or indirectly – much of the territory surrounding Afghanistan. The Russians have a natural interest in keeping Islamist terrorism at bay. But only to a point: should Americans and Europeans consolidate and expand their influence in Afghanistan, Russian power in Central Asia would potentially suffer. And there should be no mistake about that: the Kremlin is in the business of impeding American and European penetration into its Central Asian backyard, not facilitating it.

In Russia’s eyes, giving up influence in Central Asia and the Middle East is something that can only be justified if exchanged for gains in its so-called ‘near-abroad’, namely the area encircling Russia’s core – Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. And the Russians know this won’t fly in Washington. It is one thing for Washington to express curiosity over a potential grand bargain in the region, but quite another to act on it – particularly after the Russian invasion of Georgia. After all, and although increasingly important, Russia’s cooperation is not that critical for the United States; and Eastern Europe remains too valuable a strategic asset. Not only does it allow Washington to strengthen its grip over the European Union, but it also provides a forward site for American power projection into Eurasia’s heartland and rimland areas, as well as serving as an insurance policy against the (highly unlikely) eventuality that Russia eventually finds the strength to re-emerge as a peer competitor.

In any case, over the longer term, Russian-American relations certainly look brighter. For one thing, Russia’s relative power is projected to decline further, while other powers will go on rising – especially China. In the decades to come, Moscow will strive for an autonomous strategic space within the Eurasian heartland as the world system becomes progressively multipolar. And notwithstanding Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-type illusions, any future in which China and Russia cooperate harmoniously is hard to envision. Only American unilateralism has masked the inherent tension between Moscow and Beijing; as this wanes such tension will re-emerge, and Russia may look to its old rival in the Western Hemisphere for support.

This does not necessarily mean that Russia will forge a rock-solid alliance with Washington; only that, in the unfolding American-Chinese struggle, Moscow’s allegiances are more likely to rest with Washington than with Beijing. The alternative – a strategic partnership with China – would be a far more oppressive scheme, and this is something Moscow is well aware of. A giant and powerful China, with its eyes set squarely on Russia’s vast Siberian wastes, would become a major concern for the Kremlin. If it comes down to a choice between Washington and Beijing (and some day it most likely will), Moscow would choose the lesser of two evils and eventually accept greater American involvement in Central Asia.

Washington’s geostrategic focus in the Eastern half of Eurasia will only continue to grow. Many Americans will come to see greater Russian cooperation in both the Middle East and Central Asia as ever more desirable to offset a rising China. And any upgrade in Russian-American relations would require Washington to cut Moscow some slack in those areas that lie closest to the latter’s heart.

But this will all have a big impact on Europeans. They will have less to worry about if China slows down or is geopolitically frustrated. This would also be the dream scenario from an American perspective: maintaining a balance of power in both Europe and East Asia would not depend on the goodwill of a third party (even if a friendly one, like the European Union) but only on the United States. In such a scenario, Europeans could sit back and leave the United States to do the heavy lifting in Central Asia and the Middle East, while benefiting economically from the reduced need to build-up their strategic resources and reach. But the chances are that China will continue to rise and, as America’s relative power declines, Washington will be forced to make choices.

As a new strategic conundrum unfolds, the United States will probably realise that Eastern Europe, first, and the Middle East, later, will be relatively more and more expendable if compared to Central Asia, the Indian Ocean region or East Asia – where the future great game will inevitably take place. Europeans must begin to work under this assumption, with an eye on acquiring greater geostrategic influence over Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Hesitation today will only jeopardise the European interest tomorrow, when the realities of a changing geopolitical landscape knock on the door of the demographically ageing continent. And only the European Union provides a viable framework for any European geostrategic reawakening.

So far as Washington has played tough cop on Russia (and the Middle East) Europeans have been able to follow the free-rider’s textbook: let the Americans do the heavy lifting from which Europeans ultimately benefit while sitting back and talking about complexity, while praising the benefits of engagement, dialogue, and so forth. Yet as the global geopolitical tide changes, Europeans are likely likely to have no choice but to dust off their old strategic software. Or else their current vulnerability in Eastern Europe, and over the supply of gas and oil, will come to look like peanuts compared to how it would be without Washington’s umbrella. Undoubtedly, this is fast becoming the real test of whether Europeans are able to break away from the strategic prison in which they have locked themselves during the past sixty years. And time is running out.

• Credit to the White House for picture.