0:11, 2 September 2009
By Luis Simón
History tells us that multipolar orders tend to be less stable than unipolar or bipolar ones. Having spent the last sixty years under the blanket of bipolarity and then unipolarity, it is time for Europeans to think about how the coming multipolar international system will affect their geopolitical standing. This post aims to contribute to that.
Geostrategic contingency planning is the art of anticipating a geostrategy in a given geopolitical environment. It therefore projects how the geopolitical environment is likely to evolve; it is contingent in that it must deal with important unknowns. It is, by definition, a speculative exercise, yet a crucial one. Among the most important unknowns we face when trying to predict the geopolitical evolution of the world in the coming decades are, arguably, the pace and nature of China and India’s rise; America’s long term commitment to remain actively engaged globally; the evolution of Russia; and the political take-off of the European integration project – or, for that matter, the demographic sustainability of any potential European global power.
Geostrategic contingency planning contains an important dimension of uncertainty. This said, it is safe to assume that the emerging multipolar system will be roughly quadripolar: the United States, China, India and the European Union. The values and internal workings of each of those power centres will surely present considerable differences. Yet, their behaviour will by and large determine the evolution of the international system.
Three of these powers – China, India and the European Union – are situated in the Eurasian landmass. The other one – the United States – is not. It should therefore follow that the role of ‘offshore balancer’ in the twenty-first century is likely to correspond to the United States, by virtue of geography. This certainly is a causal correlation very much present in the minds of a great deal of American realists. To them, their secure position in the Western Hemisphere, guarded by the two great oceans of the world, makes the United States the natural offshore balancer for Eurasian geopolitics.
But if geography is the most permanent of all factors in international politics, we cannot neglect history or geostrategic and geoideological path dependencies – at play for over six decades. These offer Europeans a fantastic opportunity to occupy the offshore balancer seat themselves. In contrast to the rather inward-looking Europeans, the United States remains presently engaged around the Pacific-Rim –heavily committed to the defence of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, among others. After all, Eastern Eurasia, including China and India, is part of America’s geostrategic neighbourhood.
Yet, out of the four emerging centres of global power, it is the European Union that actually sits furthest away from the Far East, a region likely to experience the highest degree of geopolitical tension in the twenty-first century. This distant proximity does not mean that Europeans should be indifferent to this dynamic region – far from it. The European Union must remain wary of geopolitical events around the Asian rim, and maintain a sufficient degree of forward presence to guarantee the flow of European trade and energy supplies. But it must do this while it simultaneously attempts to avoid taking sides in the emerging struggle involving the United States (and its allies, Japan and South Korea), China and India.
Europeans must remain passively vigilant towards the geopolitical destinies of the East Asia-Pacific zone and make sure they stay clear of the ‘containing China’ bandgwagon. Preventing China or, for that matter, any other power from dominating the resources of Eastern Eurasia is surely in the European interest. Yet, unfolding geopolitical alignments (notably the growing closeness between the United States and India) may suffice in guaranteeing an acceptable balance of power in the region. This geopolitical struggle will sap a great deal of resources from the Americans, Chinese and Indians, which may give the European Union a free ride closer to home, allowing Europeans to consolidate their position in their extended proximal zone.
To be sure, neutrality in East Asia would offer Europeans important advantages, trading and otherwise. For one thing, it would facilitate an understanding with China in those regions where Beijing is propping up its presence and where Europeans have vested interests – namely Africa and the Middle East. For Beijing, securing Europe’s neutrality in East Asia would be an important geopolitical objective in itself. Hence, this offshore status would offer Europeans an advantageous position vis-à-vis China in the regions surrounding the European Union. Further, this balancer status and brokering quality would allow Europeans to help alleviate and downplay potential tensions among the other great powers.
Indeed, the Union could aspire to become the ultimate power broker, the geopolitical arbiter of the twenty-first century. Europeans would be in a fantastic position to co-ordinate efforts aimed at engineering collective solutions to common security concerns (i.e. WMD proliferation, organised crime in any of its forms, climate change, etc.). It would be at the vanguard of most collective enterprises – among them, most notably, the United Nations system. In this sense, the bet on notions such as Effective Multilateralism or peacekeeping is not a necessarily naïve one, provided it is accompanied by a broader sense of geostrategic awareness.
As such, it is of the utmost importance that Europeans do not become entangled into the power games of the three main East Asian powers. For this, the European Union must buffer away Eurasia and consolidate its position in its neighbourhood and near abroad while limiting the influence of the other great powers there.
In this regard, Russia represents a particularly challenging element in the Union’s geopolitical calculations. Some in Europe continue to argue that Russia may eventually be integrated into some sort of European sphere. This is certainly a possibility, even if a long way off in the future. Much ink has also been devoted in the past to the question of the European vocation of Russia. But, leaving aside Moscow’s reticent attitude to joining a political union with Europeans on the basis of equal footing, it is not at all very clear how any sort of political entity stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok would be in the European interest either. For that would effectively make Brussels a direct player in the Far East, throwing the lucrative prospect of offshore balancer down the toilet.
Ironically, it might be in the European interest for Russia to retain an autonomous space of its own in the Eurasian Heartland. This way, Russia can serve as a buffer against any future overspill of insecurity or conflict in Eastern Asia or the Pacific-Rim into the European continent.
In contrast to the passive vigilance that the geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region recommends, the Union should pursue a more robust strategy in its neighbourhood and near abroad just beyond. The expansion of Brussels political influence in its neighbourhood – places such as Ukraine, the Caucasus and North Africa – should be accelerated through a combination of integration and quasi-integration schemes. A maritime ‘forward presence’ will also be required in the Arctic region, an area which will most likely serve as an alternative trading route between Europeans and Asia only a few decades down the line. Also, Europeans must considerably bump-up their influence over their ‘near abroad’ – namely the Sahel belt and Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and, most crucially, the Middle East.
In this regard, bringing Turkey into the Union is a geopolitical must and Europeans should not underestimate the geopolitical importance of this issue. Not only would it become a valuable asset in the Union’s struggle for energy diversification; it would also provide for a stronger European presence in the Caucasus. Perhaps even more importantly, Turkey would make the ideal vehicle for bolstering the Union’s involvement in the Middle East. With Turkey on board, Europeans would more easily downplay the old phantoms of European-Islamic antagonism, to which revisionist power seekers in the region so commonly resort. These phantoms too often stand in the way of better governance, prosperity and stability in the Middle East – three preconditions for European security.
Finally, being as they are in the fine line that separates the European near and further abroad regions, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia will most severely test the Union’s ability to navigate active engagement and passive vigilance within its nascent geostrategic framework. At sea the former, on land the latter, these two areas are of direct geopolitical relevance to Europeans – as well as important scenes for American, Chinese and Indian posturing.
So can Europeans play the role of offshore balancer in the twenty-first century? Only if they begin buffering Eurasia to balance East Asia. This approach should place the European Union in an advantageous position as the geopolitical arbiter of the world, an initiating force for any collective endeavour aimed at addressing common problems and downplaying geopolitical tensions among the other emergent great powers.
• Credit to The Lesson Plan for picture.
Very interesting article. I have a few qustions regarding Turkey and the Middle East.
Quote: ‘Perhaps even more importantly, Turkey would make the ideal vehicle for bolstering the Union’s involvement in the Middle East. With Turkey on board, Europeans would more easily downplay the old phantoms of European-Islamic antagonism, to which revisionist power seekers in the region so commonly resort.’
Don’t you think that:
1. Bringing Turkey in the Union could be a dangerous thing for political Europe. Wouldn’t the benefits you claim by integrating Turkey (more leverage for the EU upon the Middle East) be cancelled out by the tradeoff of a state member that could risk sinking the Union’s political unity?
2. If one chooses to look at the Middle East through the prism of history, don’t you think that it might be a little naïve to think that Turkey would bring the Union a real leverage upon the Middle East? Turkey being the formal coloniser (Ottoman Empire) who is mostly regarded as an ally of Israel and therefore a traitor to the Arab-Muslim cause (also Turks are not Arabs or Persians)? Isn’t the sole argument of Islam as the common denominator a bit misleading when looking at how each Middle Eastern state distrusts its Muslim neighbours, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism have both failed in the region…?
Dear Alexis: many thanks for your comments. You raise important questions. I must say that (like many, I guess) I have been switching back and forth on the issue of Turkey in the past.
‘Europeanists’ worry about the political cohesion of the Union each time enlargement bells ring. And rightly so. In some ways, the Union’s ‘political unity’ would surely suffer. We hear from one side of the debate that Turkey is just too large, too populated and too different: the thought of it being the strongest country in the Council and the Parliament in a few years is one that causes concern to many. But then, we also hear from the other side that we shouldn’t get carried away; after all, the Eastern enlargement (twelve countries) has had a much larger institutional impact than that Turkey could ever have.
Professor Simon Hix has effectively argued that the impact of bringing Turkey in could cause more damage to the Union’s political cohesion than any previous enlargement has. He raised the important point that, given cultural differences, political debates in Turkey do often not even fall within the famous right vs. left continuum that for so long has served as an ‘ordering framework’ in European political debates. That could be disorienting. In this regard, not only do I understand the reservations of those who want an ever closer political Union. I sympathise with them.
As you say, there are always tradeoffs. But let us not underestimate the Union’s ability to adapt. I think the opportunities outweigh the challenges here. This also relates to your second point. For one thing, there are positive effects in terms of image, and not just in the Middle East but also more broadly. Having Turkey in would help consolidate an image of plurality, of diversity that could serve well the Union’s ‘international power broker’ narrative I have referred to in the post. Also, there are benefits in the Middle East. You are right: there is much more to ‘Islam’ to the politics of the region – aside from the whole Arab vs. non Arab thing, these days people also like to talk about the contrasts between the Shia and the Sunni. You are also right to say that Turkey is often seen, because of its history or its foreign policy over the last decades, as an external in some quarters. So is Jordan considered a traitor by many, or Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, or…
All this aside, the cleavage between Islamic vs. non Islamic world remains an important one in the politics of the region. And for we Europeans, the more we downplay the importance of that cleavage, the better. Bringing Turkey in would be a step forward in downplaying that importance. Refusing to take Turkey (even if for different reasons) would send the signal that it is an important cleavage for us. And I don’t even want to get into the debate of whether the cleavage is important or not. I am talking about perception, something which matters so much in the politics of the region. Enlarging to Turkey would also be a visible and compelling excuse for a reluctant Europe to further engage in the Middle East – something we cannot get away from.
Turkey would bring to the table knowledge and experience to the Union’s dealings with the region. It would facilitate diplomacy as well as cooperative ventures in the economic or cultural realms. It would also offer the Union a fantastic territorial base for ‘power projection’ in case it needed to intervene in the region. Then there is the energy question, which relates to both the Middle East and the wider Black Sea region. Turkey is destined to further consolidate its position as an energy hub, sitting as it is between Europe and the Middle East and Europe and the Caucasus-Central Asian corridor. It will be a key player of energy politics in the decades to come. Having it would make it much easier for the Union to pursue energy diversification. Not that I want to silence the challenges of a ‘Turkish enlargement’. But, as I said, I think they are outweighed by the opportunities.
Hey Louis: Good blog. A European Mackinder. However, before attempting a Brezezinskiite prescription for Europe, I think a look at the current terrain is useful. The problem is that as things are progressing, Germany is taking a back seat in Europe whilst Russia decimates European political cohesion and atlanticism through energy – Georgia being a prime case.
Russia’s attempts to reverse its decline in Eurasia are obvious in Central Asia. European and US attempts have failed to prevent Russia from blocking European/US energy at source points in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. A situation which NATO in Afghanistan looked to remedy but now finds blocked.
The most potent factor in Eurasia is undoubtedly Islam. I disagree with Alexei: transnational Islam is far from a failure. The global political realities only confirm the opposite.
Without Communism, both Russia and China have no global message for attraction. Russian and Chinese nationalism have little ideological impact on Islam’s influence. From Asia through to the Caucuses, its meteoric rise threatens to destabilise both the Chinese and Russian influences. Having just spent some time in Turkey recently, there is no doubt that an Islamic revival of some sorts is definitely occurring.
What it demonstrates is that Turkey is not immune to the transnational spread of radical Islam. In fact at present there is an interesting phenomena occuring in Turkey as a reaction to European non-entry which is the return of an Ottoman identity, some of it based on cosmopolitanism, some in trade, but a substantial part in Islamic identity and history. It’s recent allowance of the Russian South Stream project is no doubt a warning shot from the politicians to Europe concerning not only its membership issue but also its potential without it.
Interestingly Brezinzski did not talk negatively of Islam in his Grand Chessboard in relation to Eurasia. No doubt judging from his history of promoting Islam as a strategic tool in Afghanistan, it would have been in his mind concerning a plan of action to curtail Russia. The debate raging in Europe at present is to what extent does Islam represent European identity. Tariq Ramadan contests that because of the Ottomans and Spain, Islam is an integral part of European identity. If so, then Turkey should not really be much of a problem. I look forward to your European power perspectives to these points.
Dear Luis: Congratulations for this interesting blog.
There is plurality in the United States’ race breakdown, and I think that perhaps at least tenfolding Turkey’s diversity: is this plurality raising sympathies in the Middle East anytime the United States comes into this scenario for any reason?
Will the former Balkan colonies of Turkey accept this partner into the European Union?
Turkey will not accept to be a base to project NATO’s power in the region as happened in the last Iraq war. We cannot rely in these people as they have different cultural links and areas of influence. Now this roll is largely played by the Caucasian Republics and Turkey’s stategic military role it is not needed with such a degree.
Yet the issue of Cyprus has to be addressed by Turkey before it can go further with the European relationship. Lastly, Turkey it is not a reliable ally because the cultural clash, especially with its former Eastern Europe colonies.
May I also remind you of the constant and current violations of Greek air sovereignty from the Turkish airforce, and recent incidents between Greeks and Turkish fighters in Hellenic territory? Not so long ago also, Turkish submarines were spotted in Greek waters in the Aegean Sea and forced to surface by Hellenic anti-submarine planes. Turkey also blocked Russian military sea cargos heading to Greek Cyprus in the Marmara strait – a cargo with Russian anti-aircraft missiles. Is Turkey applying the same interest intercepting illegal inmigration in the Aegean and Black Sea to the Balkans? How can this massive flow of immigrants be influencing in Balkan economies and societies? Illegal immigration is a such issue in the poor Balkan economies that an ‘open border’ policy is hard to accept.
Will the former nations that fought in the Balkan wars against Turkey in the twentieth century rely on Turkey as a military partner? The Balkans, except Bosnia and Albania, will never accept military deals with Turkey. Please check the history of the Balkan wars for further references.
Dear Norman: thanks for your comment. You do raise two key issues for European foreign policy: relations with Russia and the spread of transnational Islam. I have in fact argued elsewhere that these are, arguably, the two most important challenges to the idea of Europe as a power.
You mention the contradiction between European and Russian interests in Central Asia. Shuting out the Union’s access to the region’s energy reserves (mainly gas) is a central tenet of Russian foreign policy. In the eyes of the Kremlin, preserving a quasi-monopoly of Europe’s gas supply will buy Russia the respect it seems to have lost in Europe over the past decades. This monopoly serves as currency for all the other issues that define European-Russian relations. Most importantly, the Kremlin believes, it buys the whole idea of Russian influence in Eastern Europe some respect in Western Europe.
On the other hand, without Western Europe’s unambiguous commitment to the security and stability of their Eastern European partners, the whole idea of a political Europe or that of the EU as a global power seems like a bad joke. And it isn’t just European solidarity that is at stake here: it would be too foolish if Western Europeans were to allow a growingly influential Russia in the East. Bear in mind that in the coming years, US commitment to preserving a power balance in the European continent will not be as strong as it used to be in the good old days. This takes us back to your point: breaking away from Russia’s energy prison is a matter of strategic urgency for Europeans. Many would argue, myself included, that this is the most imminent strategic challenge the EU faces today.
Then there is the issue of transnational Islam. You point to the importance of some sort of ideology or system of values as an indispensable transmission belt for power expansion. I do sympathise with your point. Not only can transnational Islam expand; it can, if put at the service of revisionist power seekers, turn into Europe’s chief strategic threat. Perhaps most importantly, this presents a range of domestic issues for Europeans given the growing presence of Islam within our societies. Europe’s history and the whole concept of Europe go hand in hand with neighbouring Islam. As you say, Spaniards know this well. And this isn’t something we Europeans can just turn away from. This is why, I believe, Europe has no option but to de-emphasise the whole Islam vs. Christianity mumbo jumbo. Our relations with the Middle East or, for that matter, Northern Africa cannot be hijcaked by that. This is why, I believe, welcoming Turkey into the Union sends the right message.
Thanks for the responses, Luis.
No doubt that the intricate Turkey dilemma will continue fuelling passionate debate.
I would like to respond to Norman Hanif comment about transnational political Islam.
I do agree there are facts that plead in favour of a partly successful transnational Islamist movement and I did not mean that transnational Islam was totally redundant. To some extent we may point out the role of Saudi Arabia (the cradle of Wahabism, one of the most radical Ideologies of political Islam) in financing international radical Islam education and the inherent Jihad in most of the hot spots across Eurasia as well as North and East Africa, such as, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq to some extent, Chechnya, Algeria, Sudan… We could also refer to al-Qaida and its multiple sleeping and active cells across the region.
However in my opinion we are far from the emergence of a really effective pan-Islam entity capable of holding cohesive sway in Eurasia as a whole like nation states or transnational entity such as the EU can do. Conflicts remain mainly local and most of the time the political Islam facet is entangled with national historical and/or ethnic considerations that make up for an intricate political mosaic. In such context the religious medium is the opportunity for local actors to gather support and momentum in order to achieve a local political agenda rather than a real international cohesive movement.
For instance, Afghanistan during the nineties: after a difficult union full of compromise between the different leaders of the Afghan opposition to the Soviet invader notably between Hekmatyar (ethnic Pashtun – backed up by the Pakistani ISI and the CIA) and the general Massoud (ethnic Tadjik – head of the northern alliance) the fight was led under the common denominator of Islam and against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. Once the Soviets eventually withdrew from Afghanistan and as soon as the capital Kabul fell, internal strives for political power resumed between the different warlords and ethnic groups who were all eyeing power. Never was Islam as a binding faith/ideology strong and homogeneous enough to unify the different parties and provide a strong governing national body. As a result of this political vacuum the civil war resumed partly played out by the Pakistani ISI (another supposedly friendly Islam neighbour) through the emergence of the Taleban while all parties where more or less claiming to lead the war in the name of Islam.
Another striking example: the Iraq vs. Iran war during the eighties. Saddam Hussein was a champion of the pan-Arab cause and a modern secular nation state model through his Baath party. He conducted a ruthless repression of the Shia community in the south of the country (Shia make up for the majority of the Iraqi population). The eastern neighbour, Iran -which also encompasses a majority of Shia and experienced an Islamic revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini (who happened to have studied and spent a long time in Najaf and Kerbala in south Iraq in exile) in 1979 – was willing to export its Shia revolution across the Persian gulf. At that time the westerners backed Iraq in its war against fundamental Islam. Many thought/feared and anticipated (including the Iranians and Saddam Hussein himself) that the Shia in south Iraq would fight along the Iranians to topple Saddam Hussein secular regime. Not only did it not happen as predicted but the Iraqi Shia turned out to dearly fight this war on Saddam Hussein’s side and rank among the most enthusiast fighters. In this case, the national and ethnic considerations eventually prevailed over the religious ones even though the context was greatly favouring transnational religious alliance.
These two examples are just a few among many others – not to mention the big split between Sunni and Shia communities within Islam which makes the family even more fragmented. To me, it seems that facts across the 20th century till nowadays confirm that the pan-Islam model has also failed to establish itself as a coherent force which could influence the region as a whole and weight as much strategic importance as the nations or the EU.
That is why I believe Islam (the religious aspect in general) is more of a tactical consideration when it comes to local and sometimes by extent regional tackling (for instance the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its ties to Iran), just like ethnic and historical perspectives are. However it does not weight as much strategic importance as a rising Iran, a resurrecting Iraq and an increasingly self confident Turkey.
Quote from Luis:
‘This is why, I believe, Europe has no option but to de-emphasise the whole Islam vs. Christianity mumbo jumbo. Our relations with the Middle East or, for that matter, Northern Africa cannot be hijcaked by that. This is why, I believe, welcoming Turkey into the Union sends the right message.’
I absolutely agree with this; however, I would add that beyond integrating Turkey, Europe should promote its own ‘Muslim model’. We all agree Islam has been involved in European history and culture at many times. Turkey should not be the sole option in terms of branding Europe as a Muslim friendly land. A country like France, where ten percent of its population is Muslim, and also hosts the biggest Jewish community in the world after Israel and the U.S., could be helpful in promoting a multi-confessional and religiously open and tolerant modern Europe. All of these in a secular European frame.
Do you think that the currently invaded and occupied Turkish territories of the EU. will accept Turkey’s merbership?
Turkey also has to stop its agressive military approach in the Aegean Sea. Turkey is the only country in Europe that has invaded and holds an ocuppation army force in a territory of a member of the EU.
An economic outlook on South Cyprus/North Cyprus will give you more clues on how could be the Turkish integration on the long run into our economic structure. An interesting especulative thinking also may be carried out on the influence of the cultural and religious matters on the economic structure, based naturally on facts in Cyprus.
Finally, currently there is a sort of military conflict running in the Balkans, which is also an economic one, with scary unemployment and poverty figures. Do not you think that it is better to fully integrate the Balkans and the Black Sea area into the economic structure and balance current inequalities within EU before considering going further (and still, by the way, there is much to do)?
Do not you think that the Caucasus holds more interesting potential countries like Georgia for accession, far more reliable than Turkey and with less complex and less controversial issues?
Do not you think that the Caucasus should be brought into the EU first, leaving the unmanageable issue of Turkish integration for a more favourable time in the long term?
Alexis, Roberto, thanks again for your great comments. Alexis, I agree with you that there is much more to do than integrating Turkey into the Union. Roberto, your point is also well taken. I’m not saying that Turkey will join the Union. Im saying it should. That said, I am quite sceptical about its prospects. And not only due to Cyprus, Greece or other Member States from the Balkans. Some of the big fishes have also expressed their opposition (notably Germany and France). I am not trying to downplay the importance of the specifics and timing of a potential enlargement to Turkey. Im just trying to point out longer trends here.
Surely, I do think that we have to integrate the Balkans. I don’t know what you mean exactly by integrating the Black Sea region. The issue of Ukraine is also a tough one. We will address that issue from a ‘strategic’ perspective at a later stage. As for the Caucasus, I’m not sure that the best solution is integration. Sure, we must be more engaged there and not less. I agree with you that the Caucasus is an area of key strategic interest for the Union (think energy security). But having the Caucasus ‘in’ and Turkey ‘out’ would not make much of a difference, not least as the Turkish will certainly increase their influence in that region.
As a Turkish citizen, I do not understand the logic behind Turkey’s insistence on the EU membership. Turkey is not only European, but also Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Balkan, Caucasian and from the Black Sea. Turkey’s identity and heritage is too rich to be relegated to sole European identity.
Actually, I don’t mind seeing people opposing Turkey’s entry to the EU for various reasons. They can be right in some instances. They can also be wrong. I believe one should try to be objective in his/her analysis. I am from Turkey and I criticise some of the policies of Turkish government too. However, in order to comment on one issue, one should also have prior – impartial, non-partisan – knowledge about it.
The picture would now seem that Turkey could be seen as invading a piece of EU territory. However, the Cyprus problem thoroughly predates the EU membership and the EU knew this would come while accepting the South Cyprus. Besides, this also gave the South Cyprus a tool to put pressure on Turkey for EU membership just like Slovenia has on Croatia and Greece has on Macedonia. The EU is totally unsuccessful as a problem solver in international problems spreading over its territories, and this would cause it much more trouble in the future.
You can criticise Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 – this is another issue – but you cannot ignore the whole historical problem and easily claim that Turkey invades an EU territory, that will be hypocrisy.
Another point: why do all Europeans tend to just look at the year 1974 for discussing the Cyprus issue? Why don’t they read what happened in 1963? Is anyone aware of a terrorist organisation EOKA formed in Cyprus in 1950s? Did anyone read Harry Scott Gibbons’ ‘Genocide Files’? Did anyone ever think why Turkey invaded Cyprus in the first place? Is Turkey that much bully or the “other” for you people?
For Roberto who claimed that the EU should leave aside Turkey, an unmanagable country, and look for Georgia: for one thing, nobody can manage Turkey. Can the EU manage the UK or Greece? I don’t think so. Another point: if the EU tends to approach Georgia for membership, it will actually prepare its end. At that point how do you think the EU can ‘manage’ Russia and all the problems it will carry? The good thing though, at that point, Turkey most probably will opt out of its membership demands.
Finally, I would like Europeans to overcome your hatred of Turkey and try to think objectively while speaking about my country.
I am really tired of seeing Turkey being equalised with Islam, which has already been demonised. It is true that Turkey has become increasingly conservative and Islamic. I am totally uncomfortable with this. However, what gets me is that the Eurocrats wholeheartedly support the pro-Islamic ruling party in Turkey, who gradually laid the seeds of Islamic fundamentalism amongst the Turkish public. On the other hand, the EU politicians and the public wholeheartedly oppose an ‘Islamic’ country as a member. I am really confused here. What does the EU want from Turkey? Is this a trick, EU?