23:37, 23 November 2009
In their recent guest article on European Geostrategy, Riccardo Alcaro and Emiliano Alessandri make a number of interesting points about the relationship between Russia and the European Union (and the United States). They point out that the argument frequently made in various German and Italian circles – that satisfying Russian demands on a number of levels will lead to a friendlier Russia – is baseless and has clearly not worked. They argue that Europeans must assume a more credible, pro-active and effective strategy when dealing with Moscow, rather than the disjointed mishmash of policies that have been utilised to date. And they point out that Russia must be engaged by Europeans, due to its close geographical proximity – something that cannot be ignored.
Yet I would like to offer a response to some of their other points, particularly with regards to:
- That Europeans ‘should exclusively aim to have Russia take on the role of a responsible stakeholder in a multi-pillar security arrangement in Europe comprising NATO, the United States, the European Union, and Russia’;
- That Europeans should give up on attempting to alter the political structures and values adopted by Russia under the regime of Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev.
With regards to the first point, I think they are, respectfully, wrong. Their approach in this sense is symptomatic of Cold War thinking, especially amongst those subscribing to the old policy of Ostpolitik. That is to say, it reflects the opinion that Russia must be present within the realm of European security, effectively a geographic space now coterminous with the European Union and the European Neighbourhood. Either because of its power, or because it is thought to be a European country, this argument implies that Russia has a legitimate role to play in the politics and security of the European continent.
But should not any self-respecting European disagree with this view? Is it not as outmoded as it is outdated? I think it is; and here’s why: since the defeat of the Soviet Union, Russian power has been permanently pushed out of Central and Eastern Europe. Consequentially, the European integrationist project has undergone a series of geographic enlargements, to cover many of the regions once under the Kremlin’s yoke. This has been linked with the functional expansion of the European political system, which has been planted throughout much of the European homeland. What was once a multipolar sub-system has subsequently become an integrated political unit, under the aegis of the European Union.
So extensively has this project developed, that a great residual region has been formed, widely known as the European Neighbourhood. Should not Europeans now aim to bring this zone tightly under their political and economic influence, seeing off any attempts by foreigners to subvert their interests? If so, there can surely no longer be any role for Russia in this region, let alone in the European Union itself. After all, it is a question of political credibility and domestic cohesion: would the United States enable the Canadians or the Mexicans to meddle in its internal affairs? Would China, or India allow their neighbours (or one another) to do the same? Of course not. Likewise, Europeans must dump Cold War thinking and adopt a more confident, assertive, and Europe-first approach.
With regards to the second point, I think it is too soon to ditch attempts to alter Russia’s political composition. The argument that the domestic situation in Russia is profoundly linked to its foreign policy is a strong one. Why? In short, Russia’s lacking of natural borders means that it is a very unstable political edifice that has to push outwards to survive. If Europeans allow Russia to extend its geopolitical clout in regions where their own interests must be placed centre-stage, then the internal contradictions of Russian society will spill out. In other words, if we do not contain Russian designs over the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, we will make political reform there and in Russia itself less, not more, likely. It can be no coincidence that the ‘open society’ – a system almost entirely alien to Russia’s history – reached its apogee in Russia during the country’s geopolitical decline throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Likewise, since Moscow’s development of a more aggressive strategy since 1999, the domestic entrenchment of democracy and liberty has been downgraded as a policy, to be replaced by a doomed and dangerous authoritarian ‘nationalist revival’ project instead.
Accordingly, we Europeans must think a lot harder about our policy towards Russia, and we should not be frightened of asserting the European interest. Good relations with Russia should not be pursued for their own sake, particularly if this endangers or weakens the European Union and its political authority in the European Neighbourhood. But a reactive anti-Russian approach should be rejected too. With good policy that encompasses all dimensions of our power, we can bring the Russian people back towards the European mainstream. Bilateral relations between the Member States and Russia must gradually come to an end, and European-Russian relations should take their place. Given that Europeans – when aggregated – are vastly more powerful in every sense than our Russian neighbour, we should seek to craft a strategy that transforms Russia in relation to us as Mexico is to the United States: friendly, pliable, and of no particular concern to our interests in neighbouring zones – of which Russia should itself form a part. From this new relationship, we can both benefit.
Russia is still playing ‘divide and rule’. First, they agreed a pipeline deal with Germany that would bypass both Ukraine and other eastern states in the Russian ‘sphere of influence’. Today, they announce a deal with EDF of France to participate in the building and running of the pipeline – with benefits to France, no doubt?
For so long as individual nations allow themselves to be picked off like this, what hope is there for a coordinated EU approach to Russia?
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Hello French Derek: To answer your question, very little! We can only hope that they see the value in the European rather than the Member State over a longer period of time.
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Really? The EU, ex hypothesi, is more powerful than Russia militarily? Consider the scenario where Russia does invade Crimea (real possibility) should Ukraine be pushed into the NATO alliance. Would the West win an ensuing war with Russia in that conflict scenario?
Equally to the point, is there a power on the face of the earth that can militarily defeat Russia in a war in that part of Eurasia where it is legitimately fending off encirclement from both the Western Alliance and increasingly China?
I believe it was Lord Salisbury (British premier and statesman) who was egregious enough to remind imperial expansionists within the British policy-making circles of the heydays of the British Empire that if their stated policy preferences (with respect especially to the other Great Powers) is likely to cause a war, a crucial question needs answering: to wit, ‘are you really prepared to fight?’ And if the answer is a ‘no’ then they should rethink their policy preferences.
The Russo-Georgian war of last August demonstrates clearly that Western policy-makers who argue for aggressively expanding the Western Alliance at the expense of other powers must ultimately answer Salisbury’s question: ‘Are you really prepared to fight?’
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Hamjatta: now that the Bush era in the United States has passed – and also that everyone can now see how shaky the democratic situation in Ukraine is – I cannot see NATO membership being pushed very hard. Membership of the EU is, however, more likely, since both the PM and ex-President (challengers to current President in the coming election) are said to favour EU membership (plus improved relationships with Russia. We must wait and see on that).
As for war: Ukraine is a different proposition to Georgia. Ukraine is still necessary to Russia for gas supplies to Europe (new pipelines won’t be ready for some years yet).
And why talk of war? Europe – and, perhaps the US – would prefer partnership with Russia than conflict. I have even seen speculation about possible future membership of the EU (very speculative, in my view). But the EU policy of partnership (with the EU) is why EU members should behave less nationalist and more European.
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Hamjatta: Yes, the European Union—or rather, two of its Member States (Britain and France)—are stronger than Russia militarily. They both have the means to move large numbers of troops and materiel to almost any region of the world. Russia does not have that capability, although, unfortunately, the French currently seem hell-bent on giving it to them (see the reports surrounding the potential sale of the Mistral helicopter carrier).
The Russians must also ask the question you ask of the British expansionists. Are they really willing to fight? Yes, I have no doubt that they will do whatever they can get away with (as will any country), which is precisely what they did in August 2008 in Georgia. Moscow saw the opportunity and seized the initiative. But had the situation in Georgia been taken more seriously before the war by Europeans, subsequent events might have been radically different. The real question is whether or not the Russians are willing to press the West once it has made a firm commitment to any country within the old Soviet empire. When the West does make such a commitment, as it has, say, with regards to the Baltic states, the Russians tend to tread much more carefully…
French Derek: Some Europeans might favour closer relations with Russia. Others don’t. That is the problem, and it seems very hard to bridge. I would not ever want to see Russia join the European Union. The idea is plain crazy.
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James,
‘Yes, the European Union—or rather, two of its Member States (Britain and France)—are stronger than Russia militarily.’
Yes, if we conveniently fail to mention that the largest stockpile of nuclear arsenals in the world are in Russian hands: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/summary.htm.
I really would like to understand how a country like Britain, without an INDEPENDENT nuclear deterrent, can defeat Russia militarily, especially in Eurasia.
‘The Russians must also ask the question you ask of the British expansionists. Are they really willing to fight?’
James, unless you took a vacation to some other planet last August, the Russians have emphatically answered that question. That is, they are prepared for a war with the West when their strategic interests in Eurasia are threatened. And they have now firmly set their sights on Western strategic machinations in Ukraine.
The question really is: if Russia does instigate a breakaway ‘republic’ in the form of Crimea (dominated by ethnic Russians), upon Ukraine’s membership of NATO, is the West prepared to fight? You think that scenario too hypothetical? Think again.
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James: Things are different from last August. First, Obama has replaced Bush. Second, Medvedev appears to be imposing himself more. Third, the Russian economy is in a poor state.
Medvedev is showing willingness to talk to European countries. Russia needs the income from gas exports. As I noted earlier though, he is still using the old ‘divide and rule’ tactic.
All this talk of nuclear ‘war’ is just that – talk. The reason for holding nuclear weapons is to balance power more equally. No-one dare use them, for retaliation would lead to annihilation of both parties – if not the world. Kindergarden stuff. However, Hamjatta is right to note the use of more traditional war-making – tanks, rockets, etc. However, I’m less convinced Russia is now looking to make Crimea the next confrontation issue, because of the changes I mentioned earlier.
Also, as I noted before, NATO membership seems less, rather than more likely. Ukrainians themselves are said to be unhappy at the idea: though interested in the idea of future European Union membership (once they can get their political and economic messes sorted out). Those feelings are known to be shared by the two prospective candidates for the forthcoming Presidential election.
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French Derek: Yes, I quite agree; talk of nuclear weapons is childish. Russia will not push those buttons, for fear of the consequences. I also think Hamjatta cannot extrapolate from the Russian invasion of Georgia that Moscow is now able and willing to do the same to other countries in the region. As I said earlier: Ukraine is not Georgia. It is a large country equipped with what probably amounts to a stronger military. Just because Russia can invade a tiny nation on its borders does not mean it is able to do the same to a country approximately one-third its size. Still, that said, we should watch Russia very carefully.
Hamjatta is also wrong to highlight the fact that Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. This is largely irrelevant in my view. All that is relevant is that a country has a guaranteed second-strike capability. Britain and France both have that capability. And Britain’s nuclear stockpile is independent.
But I disagree with you, French Derek, in the sense that things have changed with Russia. Granted, it is poorer now and has a deflated ego, but it still poses a serious problem for us (which I think you allude to as well, e.g. ‘divide and rule’) and history suggests that Russian power is not entirely dependent on its economic strength but rather the country’s position (which can also become an impediment) and the political will of the regime in the Kremlin.
But I agree that NATO membership is now less likely for Ukraine and should probably have never been on the table, particularly given that a majority of the Ukrainian population is against the idea (and the fact that half of the country seems to owe allegiance to Moscow). But the same cannot be said of Georgia, where a majority still express support for the idea. Georgia is also more important to Europeans than Ukraine, being (along with Azerbaijan) the only corridor of land between Russia and Iran for Europeans’ access to the resources of Central Asia.
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Hamjatta: I think it is time to re-read James’ article. He is not proposing a confrontational approach – and, from all that I have read on the matter, it seems that most EU leaders are of the same mind. Individually, nation-states are leaning more towards a partnership with Russia*; but, as James emphasises, this should properly be done in a concerted way – i.e., through the aegis of the EU.
I do not see the EU as having made a take-over of nations that were previously within the Soviet sphere of influence. Rather, it is those countries that have voted to enter the EU. The EU does not invite (directly, anyway) people to apply, but they set entry conditions. Perhaps this democratic approach hits against Russian tendencies but they must realise that the falling of the Berlin wall brought about a fundamental political change within the individual ex-USSR sphere-of-influence nations.
* The biggest error the US made after the fall of the Berlin wall was to not engage with Russia (at the time, the EU had its hands full with the integration of East Germany). The result was that Russia declined into an economic mess. And the humiliation of that mighty country left deep scars, which Putin and his party have relentlessly poked away at, to help build their power-base.
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The Russian military does not seem too terrifying for the European Union, as the performance of the Russian army in Georgia looked rather incompetent in 2008. From time to time, the European and American media portrays the Red Army as poor where only a minor part of it is prepared to fight.
In my opinion, the different layers and channels of the relations between the different EU members and the Russian Federation display like the internal developments of the EU.
Germany intensified ties to Russia under the previous Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, as any progress in political unification had to be bought with further subsidies to French agriculture or Spanish construction branch from the German point of view.
With its economic potential and about 100,000 American soldiers on its ground, Germany does not have to fear any supply cuts or military menace by Russia. The same is true for Italy. So the resulting question for the German and Italian government is: why sacrifice the advantages of a ’special relationship’ with Russia, if their own interests within the Union are blocked by others? Examples are legion like the reduction of the Union’s huge budget for agriculture, a more efficient administration, a common solution for the refugee situation, etc.
I am not in favour of the selfish positions Germany and Italy show, but a common position towards Russia cannot be the single point whereby the EU Member States find a compromise. Russian foreign policy is not a cleaver, but rather like water, which intrudes in existing gaps.
When the phalanx of the EU is closed again, I believe relations with Russia will display again the real state of the two protagonists, and neither the state of the Russian Federation itself nor its army can really measure with those of the EU Member States. Nonetheless good relations with Russia are important for the future well-being of the EU.
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L Windhorst: I agree with a lot of what you say.
On your point about when ‘the phalanx of the EU is closed again.’ Maybe the bringing together of the EU Member States on a common foreign policy towards Russia should be a major priority for the new High Representative?
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French Derek:
I hope she will succeed and I believe also, that this should be a major priority for her. I have my doubts about the success, in the case the other big trenches are not closed or at least narrowed.
There seems to be some action concerning integrating the new Member States into the European defence architecture since the latest major Russian war game ‘West 2009′.
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A good article. Many Europeans are not ‘mature’ enough yet, but the future is this.
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