Thinking strategically: Libya
Published on by James Rogers and Luis SimónOver the last week, European leaders have demanded that Colonel Gaddafi step down from power in Libya, as a popular uprising has gained momentum against his rule. It is now time for European governments to follow through their words with actions, particularly with the implementation of a no-fly-zone to aid the rebels with their cause. There must be no more ‘hour of Europe’ incidents: it is now time for Europeans to pile on the pressure and to act. At one and the same time, Europeans must engage in a new realism, making sure they remain alert to the potential limitations of military action, while simultaneously ensuring that they do not get too carried away with all the talk of an ‘Arab Spring’.
The struggle in Libya is not a ‘civil war’
The conflict in Libya is not a ‘civil war’. It is a conflict between Colonel Gaddafi’s regime and a number of different groups of people who have come together to rid their country of a very stale and corrupt government. Labelling any struggle a ‘civil war’ is a domestic European political strategy in itself: the approach effectively castigates all parties, irrespective of who is right and who is wrong; it also seeks to silence those Europeans who call for intervention. Those who railed against European intervention in Yugoslavia during the 1990s used the same tactic – it was a shrivelled approach then; it is a shrivelled approach now. Europeans must not remain a neutral bystander in Libya, let alone support Colonel Gaddafi (as the Italian prime minister initially seemed to do) or get duped by his trickery: the European Union has legitimate interests in this conflict, a struggle that could shape the politics of the southern neighbourhood for a generation.
Why Colonel Gaddafi must go
Colonel Gaddafi cannot – repeat, must not – be allowed to re-establish his rule over Libya. Apart from the fact that he would become even more wild, truculent and dangerous, his regime’s victory would emphatically not be in the European interest:
1. Colonel Gaddafi’s success would undoubtedly embolden the opponents of liberal values around the world, while further reducing the standing and authority of Europeans and Americans as guardians of the global peace; it would reveal Europeans’ timidity and connected inability to act in the face of military aggression against civilians, not least their hypocrisy over upholding the Responsibility to Protect agenda; and it would reveal the weakness of the European Union in its own neighbourhood, even after European leaders have explicitly called for his resignation and after the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which promised to turn the European Union into a more effective and integrated global power.
2. His success would lead to massive bloodshed – particularly after the rebellion has been crushed. Should he eventually prevail, Gaddafi and his henchmen would almost certainly begin a reign of terror to systematically root out opponents much as Saddam Hussein did in Iraq after the Marsh Arab and Kurdish uprisings during and after the Gulf War of 1991. Libya would be ruthlessly brutalised: Gaddafi’s regime would likely meet out massive retribution against all former supporters of the rebel cause: inevitably there would be beatings, shootings and hangings, all of which would go on largely shielded from public view. Alternatively, given his history – as a sponsor of torture and state terrorism – and given that he may feel the need to make an example of his enemies to reinforce his rule, his regime may go further still. If Europeans allow Gaddafi to prevail, they might be forced to intervene more comprehensively in the future, especially if he decides to punish – massacre – whole towns and villages for supporting his enemies. What’s more, the rebels might be so beaten down by then that there would be few allies left for Europeans and Americans to work with on the ground, necessitating the eventual use of their own ground troops, leading, in turn, to another costly and protracted war.
3. The Gaddafi regime’s victory would animate Islamist extremists. Many of the rebels have asked for European and American help. They want a no-fly-zone so that they can push forward unhindered by aerial attack from the regime’s jet-bombers and helicopter gunships. This is an excellent moment for enlightened European self-interest: the major European powers (and the United States) have often been accused by various Islamist groups of prosecuting a war or ‘crusade’ against Muslims. By supporting the rebels in their cause, Europeans and Americans would show once again – as they did in 1999 when they sided with the Muslim Kosovars against the Christian Serbs – that this is emphatically not the case. Alternatively, if Europeans desert the Libyan rebels now in their hour of need, they would actively reinforce the Islamist creed.
The need for a European-backed no-fly-zone
The rebels both need, and have asked, for European and American military assistance in order to prevail in their struggle against Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. After two weeks of fighting, they seem unable to defeat Tripoli single-handedly: while they have the courage, they have neither the expertise nor the matériel for a swift victory. However, Britain and France have the military power and infrastructure necessary to implement a no-fly-zone over Libya (particularly over its most densely populated, coastal zone). London and Paris must implement this exclusion zone as soon as possible, preferably alongside their other European and American allies. Europeans should also bear this in mind: Libya is not Afghanistan or Iraq; unlike the latter two, it has a small population, concentrated in key cities along the coast, many of which want an end to Gaddafi’s rule. The regime’s military power is also relatively antiquated in comparison to European standards and has little recent combat experience.
Equally, although desirable, it does not matter if the United Nations Security Council fails to provide an explicit mandate for British-French action: Europeans were perfectly happy to lack this support when they began air strikes to break down Slobodan Milosevic’s intransigence in Kosovo. And in any case, Europeans should not feel that they require the backing of distant and uncooperative powers for military action in their own backyard, especially when they have humanitarian ambitions and when those they would be supporting are actively seeking their help.
The need for clear military limitations
Let us be clear: there must – repeat, must – be limits to any potential military operation in Libya. Europeans and Americans cannot fight the rebels’ struggle for them. After all, it is true that liberty is a blessing that must be earned, before it can be enjoyed. The revolutions in the world’s greatest democratic powers – the United Kingdom, the United States and France – are testament to that: in England’s case, the people had to take their liberty against Royal authority; in America’s case, they had to take it from an imperial overlord; and in France’s case, they had to take it by ousting a decrepit aristocracy. London and Paris and their allies must therefore make it very clear that they will only support the rebels and not fight their battles for them, lest Europeans (and others) get sucked fully in. Of course, some of this would depend on whether – or how quickly – the rebels can drive back the forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi. Indeed, a ‘no-tank-zone’ might also be required, in order to knock out the regime’s heavy armour; likewise, precision strikes against the regime’s headquarters and communications equipment might also be needed should the rebels meet firmer resistance than initially anticipated. Equally, but less problematically, it may be necessary to arm the rebels to provide them with the means to victory.
The need for realism
Finally, there is a need for realism – among Europeans, in particular. Old assumptions have held sway for too long. First, Europeans must realise that their neighbourhood is becoming an increasingly volatile place and that, potentially, even more dangerous and disruptive conflicts could lay in store for them in future. Here, the European Union will only survive if its Member States empower it as a military power, with the mass and velocity required for defence. This means that European governments must increase military spending and retain – and regain – the means to intervene militarily and maintain order, as well as building up a new geography of European power in surrounding peripheries. It is time for reductions in military spending and capabilities to stop – particularly in Britain’s case. Second, there has been too much European wishful thinking about the rebellions. They may not represent an ‘Arab Spring’ or a ‘democratic wave’, which is supposedly sweeping the wider Middle East. That a people want rid of a number of autocratic and stale regimes does not – repeat, does not – make them liberals or democrats. 2011 is unlikely to be the same as 1989. It is therefore time for better intelligence to find out what the rebels want so Europeans can better repress those who want things that are as antithetical to the European interest as the regimes they seek to replace, while simultaneously boosting those who might want a way of life more in keeping with liberal and constitutional preferences.

The logistics of a no-fly-zone are of necessity continuous. Is NATO willing to consider the duration of such?
Is NATO willing to bear the cost of such a conflict?
If and this is a big if, the no-fly-zone actually prevents Gaddafi’s air strikes, would NATO then go into a anti-tank mode?
The combat is mostly on the ground. The Rebels are unco-oridinated, loosely organised and without adequate arms, ammunition, leaders to effect a win.
Therefore, would NATO put ‘Peace Keepers’ (aka Kosovo), on the desert floor?
You can see the quagmire, I believe…
Semper FI
Regardless of how the term is used politically, I’d say it is at least debatable if the conflict in Libya constitutes a ‘civil war’ or not, and I would not discard the term from the outset. Taking James Fearon’s definition of civil war as ‘a violent conflict within a country fought by organised groups that aim to take power at the centre or in a region, or to change government policies’ and the widely used criterion of 1000 casualties, one could very reasonably argue that this conflict is indeed a civil war.
Also, I’m not sure if the political use of the term ‘civil war’ really plays into the hands of those who reject intervention since I’d say that the term has a much more ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ connotation than during the 1990s, partially resulting from the horrible and tragic aftermaths of the 1990s civil wars.
Firstly, I must say that, as a European citizen, after reading this article, I’m convinced that the United Kingdom and France should act and I hope most European Union Member States will join in the effort.
It may be harsh to say this, taken into consideration that there are people suffering on the ground in Libya, but this is a shining oportunity for the European Union to jump in as a global power. But that doesnt mean that the mission would be less valiant even though it serves the European Union in those terms since it would be help the Libyan people as well. Lets not forget that the Arab league has come out with support of a no-fly-zone.
I agree that Britain and France have the capability to enforce a no-fly-zone. But substantial military assistance to the rebels would also be wise and effective. It would both shorten the time of the enforcement of the no-fly-zone (and therefore decrease the cost of it overall) and also it would greatly increase the chances of a rebel victory.
Lets not forget that there are two risks towards implementing this no-fly-zone: 1. Quite possibly the rebels will not succede. 2. How will Gaddafi react if he prevails and regains power (i.e. will there be another Lockerbie terrorism attack against Europeans)?
If the rebels fail after the no-fly-zone, it would be a humiliating retreat to just abolish the exclusion zone when Gaddafi starts cracking down on the rebels after gaining full control of the country. So to prevent this, we would need as much military assistance to the rebels as possible (but there again, they are limited in what military equipment they can operate: rocket-propelled grenades, automatic rifles and possibly tanks and artillery would benefit them the most).
I have been following a plan by a US based NGO (or from a US perspective – a San Francisco based NGO) that wants to introduce a new communication process that could be used by pro-democracy groups.
They are approaching leaders to get behind this in a distinctly forceful way – putting that leader’s name in the url.
They want to make the words Public Talks part of our everyday political language.
Simon O’Corra
Institute for Public Dialogue
John Connolly
Executive Director
Sausalito, CA
http://www.obama-publictalks.info/
Really the situation in Libya and Middle East created new financial and crude oil crisis, which in my eyes will be harder than the one happened last year. Terrible, but such dictators should be removed from the governments.
Although the article is an interesting read, I think some conclusions are doubtable. The region will getting more unstable. But assuming that if Europe intervenes, risks of further instability for the future would be minimised, I consider optimistic.
The authors are stating, that Gaddafi’s success would in consequence lead to ‘reducing the standing and authority of Europeans and Americans as guardians of the global peace’. But, Europeans know that they are not seen nor accepted as the guardians of global peace and that they have no such authority. And what you don’t have, you can’t lose. Nor could Europe or the United States enforce alone wider regional peace. What they could and did enforce in the past stable regimes, by backing suppressive authorities.
Another, more than optimistic, assumption is that, by helping the rebels, Islamist influences would be diminished. The example given (Kosovo) shows pretty clear how unlikely the outcome of such a consequence is.
I see a problem in the ‘limitations’ the authors mention. Probably implementing such limitations could escalate the conflict in a controlled way. But this is just not possible and the mentioned ‘limitations’ are, in fact, a massive escalation which generates unforseeable consequences. Implementing a no-fly-zone is a oneway-ticket. If you do so you have to assure that the rebells win. The risk of a Gaddafi success for Europe is a risk it can take. Implementing a no-fly-zone and taking the risk of a Gaddhafi success is not a risk Europe should take.
But what would be needed for a rebel victory? At least some advising reconaissance forces on the ground and airstrikes, which will generate collateral damage, and even then, to really assure a victory you would have to send in supporting helicopters. Without the clear support of Islamic authorities, which probably Europe would not get, it could even evolve in a backlash, considering Europes standing in the Islamic world and the stability of the rebel regime in the future.
Even if Europe intervenes and the rebels win, they will not become its best friends. They will not forget who traded with Gaddafi, who gave him the weapons, who trained his forces (for them it will not matter whether this happened with knowledge of european governments), they will not tolerate political influence of european powers and they will not be that corrupt in foreign relations.
The outcome in Libya is not a question of existence for Europe. Europe is a military power, even taking into account its weakness, as its neighbours are incapable of building a strong military. They just lack the economic and political ressources to do so, this will not change, and therefore they are no geostrategic threat by means of military power. Whether terrorism becomes a geostrategic threat lies in the hands of the attacked and how these countries, politicians and citizens react. Fear of potential terrorism should not be a factor taken lightly into account, to support actions which have the power of generating geopolitical difference.
The conflict in Libya is a civil war. But it is a conflict which consists at least of two layers. First the tribes and their sometimes congruent, sometimes different interests. Second the youth, which is not longer willing to take restrictions implemented on them through the Gaddafi regime. This makes the political outcome of the conflict hard to guess.
So what to do? Europe would need to see the rebels organising a political factor and/or showing the capability to do so. Potentially supporting just another tribe to take over the power is a very hard option to choose from.
A no-fly-zone can be an option, but just if it would be possible to limit further escalation in certain regions and cities, where air support could be granted for the rebel forces to ‘protect civilians’ if they are losing ground. If Islamic authorities make clear that they will accept such an intervention, all rebel groups ask for it and if this clearly limited actions will guarantee a rebel success.
But most importantly, tribal leaders have first to assure that Europe gets compensation for his efforts. A nice share of ecomomic contracts, oil will be traded with the EU, not China, Brazil, or else and the treaties concerning economical refugees will stay generally untouched.
Geostrategy and military actions are always to a certain extent of an emotional nature but they must not executed in a sentimantal way.