Last year, after the Greek bail out, Germany was accused of a haughty, arrogant demeanour. It hectored profligate southern European Union Member States for their spendthrift and unrestrained ways. As the European Union’s leading industrial power, and a relatively careful spender, the Germans responded: if the European Union and Monetary Union are to survive, the spenders need to buckle-up and take the medicine, even if tastes foul. And Berlin had an important point: why should German workers work harder and longer so that their southern neighbours could live a life of luxury and retire early?

However, if some Europeans feared an arrogant Germany during the financial crisis – a view that was rather unfair on the Germans, insofar as their actions helped to get the European Union back on the tracks – Berlin’s unwillingness to support Britain and France in their pursuit of a no-fly-zone over Libya smacks of selfishness. After the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on Friday, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, stated her objections to the British-French proposal:

We have to think this through. Why should we intervene in Libya when we don’t intervene elsewhere?

For two reasons, her statement is disturbing: firstly, Germany wants to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, alongside its European colleagues, Britain and France. Having a permanent seat on the Security Council, however – at least from a European and American perspective – depends on a willingness to share responsibility for the maintenance of a world order that supports European and American preferences. Given that Germany lacks the military capabilities and strategic culture necessary for such a role, what could it bring to the table? Indeed, Angela Merkel and her foreign secretary, Guido Westerwelle – who has said he favours only political sanctions against Tripoli – have shied away from supporting an aerial exclusion zone precisely because they fear that the Bundeswehr might be called upon to help do the aerial policing.

Secondly, Libya is not just another country ‘elsewhere’; it is a country in the European neighbourhood, just a stone’s throw from several European Union Member States, not least Malta, Greece and Italy. It is a major European energy supplier and is also close to British and French military communication lines, which stretch out east along the Mediterranean and then south down into the Red Sea, the Middle East, East Africa and Indian Ocean. Instability in Libya – let alone the emergence of a new pariah state on the European Union’s border – would be very dangerous, making Europeans more dependent on Russian oil and gas. Germany may feel safe cocooned in the heart of postmodern Europe, with its ‘special relationship’ with Moscow, but it must not ignore the plight of its neighbours, or what goes on beyond the common European frontier.

This is not about ‘Germany-bashing’: the Germans have, in so many ways, been the ultimate engine of European integration, providing a near-untapped flow of money to pay for the development of other parts of the continent. German technological ingenuity and industrial might have kept the European Union afloat at the very apex of the global economy. However, whereas German economic leadership should be welcomed, Berlin’s strategic input must be questioned – at least in its current incarnation. Apart from the fact that Germany’s military is still weak and ineffective, Berlin remains mesmerised by a insular and almost anti-strategic worldview, predicated on illusions like ‘soft power’ and ‘civilian power’. Germany has no aircraft carriers and no overseas military stations: the pre-requisites for maintaining a worldwide balance of power that favours open trade and democratic interests (on which the German economy depends). Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, rather than helping to provide it, Germany has become increasingly content to consume security, safe in the knowledge that it can shelter under the protective blister provided by Britain, France and the United States – of which it is often critical.

Of course, that probably suits the British, French and Americans as much as it suits the Germans: the former three get to set the political agenda, while Germany pursues economic development unhindered and largely shielded off from the dangers and chaos outside. This is not good: German power is needed. After all, the British and the French, in particular, are in relative decline and the United States has other interests; only by sticking together through the European Union are London, Paris and Berlin likely to remain relevant as the twenty-first century rolls on. But there is a problem: German strategic culture is trapped in a timewarp, more befitting of the early 1990s, than today. In this sense, the words of Robert Cooper, made nearly fifteen years ago, could not ring out any louder:

For the postmodern state [i.e. Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden – even Britain and France to some extent], there is [...] a difficulty. We need to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security [i.e. ‘civilian power’]. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself.

Advice to postmodern states: those who have friendly, law abiding neighbours should not forget that in other parts of the world the law of the jungle reigns. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we also must use the laws of the jungle. In the coming period of peace in Europe, there will be a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers for the postmodern state.

What, then, is the message to Germany? Berlin: London and Paris actually need your assistance; but in order to provide that help, it is time to accept a proper strategic culture. Mrs. Merkel: Libya is part of the jungle; the jungle surrounds the European Union; and if you do not get to grips with the jungle, the jungle will get to grips with you. And Mr. Westerwelle: ‘civilian power’ will not work in the jungle, at least not before the jungle has been tamed. Before you can cultivate the jungle, you need to push back the dangers and chaos that lurk – like a crime – within. To do that, you must dispatch your warriors to cower and slaughter the beasts and send out your pioneers to fell the thicket. Then you can start cultivating and building: not a moment before; not a moment until.