Libya: the top ten consequences (so far)
Published on by James Rogers1. Thousands – even tens of thousands – of civilians in the city of Benghazi have been saved from the wrath of Colonel Gaddafi’s mercenaries and fighters. French airpower stopped his offensive ‘in its tracks’, after the Tripoli regime promised to show ‘no mercy’ to Benghazi’s inhabitants.
2. The opposition in Libya – which may carry in its bowels a democratic revolution and a better future for all ordinary Libyans – has been entrenched in the eastern half of the country, and tucked safely under the wings of British, French and American airpower. The Transitional National Council now has the authority, and possibly, the means, to push forward with the liberation of other parts of the country.
After being hit by a British jet-bomber, one of Colonel Gaddafi’s tanks goes up in a puff of smoke
3. The stale regime of Colonel Gaddafi has been weakened, humiliated and brought to heel after nearly forty-two years of totalitarian repression at home and the support of terrorism overseas.
4. The principal Western powers – Britain, France and the United States – have proven, contrary to the delusions of the Islamist extremists, that they do care about the plight of Arabs and Muslims (as they showed previously in Kosovo), and will mobilise their resources for humanitarian assistance whenever they can.
5. British and French power has been bolstered; the two countries have been drawn closer together as the dominant European geopolitical powers, in keeping with their strategic agreements signed during November 2010. The British prime minister has passed – with flying colours – his first serious test as a statesman, while the French president has recovered some of his reputation from his mistakes in Georgia in 2008.
6. With an ill-conceived grand strategy and mired in pacifism, Germany has humiliated itself. Libya has shown that Berlin will be sidelined if it challenges London and Paris on issues pertaining to foreign and military policy. A period of reflection seems to be breaking out among the German diplomatic community regarding their country’s position in the European Union and the wider world.
7. The European Union has – unfortunately – been rendered an irrelevance, largely because Germany chose to challenge Britain and France. Equally, the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, made a profound mistake when she confronted so brazenly the British and French over their desire for airstrikes against the Tripoli regime; consequentially, her reputation has sunk to an all-time-low.
8. Europeans – and hopefully, above all, the British – have been shown that they must not rely on the United States for their security, or to sort out problems in their own backyard. President Obama, whether deliberately or through dithering, has made it evidently clear that Europeans must start to look after themselves, even though he authorised the use of significant American firepower during the first phase of the military operation against Colonel Gaddafi.
9. The United Nations Security Council has been reinforced. Unlike with the Iraq imbroglio, the Security Council has given the coalition comprehensive legal legitimacy and the mandate to take whatever action is necessary – short of the occupation of Libya – to protect its people from Colonel Gaddafi’s vengeance.
10. Those in the United Kingdom who were concerned about the implications of the Strategic Defence Review – undertaken last autumn – have grown louder. They have begun to argue that the review cut back on too many British military capabilities, leaving Britain in a vulnerable state and unable to act. Their voices will probably grow louder still in the weeks ahead, forcing the government to re-open the review and take British foreign and security policy more seriously.
• Image credit: Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom).
Very good, easy to read balance sheet, thanks. Of course, the capacity problem with the British ‘warfare state’ can be remedied by spreading the burden with the rest of the European Union, especially as the United States seems to be becoming more realistic about its own role and capabilities.
To expand on your point seven, is there yet an in-depth analysis of the European Union’s failure to rise to the occasion? And what comparative information is there of public opinion on this issue in each Member State?
Syd: Thanks for your comment. Yes, I quite agree with the need to ‘Europeanise’ key military capabilities: Britain should not have to bear a larger burden than other European Union Member States. I suspect we will go through a phase of British-French consolidation before we see that though.
I have not seen a comprehensive analysis of the European Union’s failings yet. However, I hope that if you take a look at the last four posts (before this one) we’ve done on European Geostrategy, it should provide some insight. In particular, I would argue that Germany has been the obstruction (for trying to assert itself through ‘civilian power’), along with some very peculiar behaviour on the part of Catherine Ashton (i.e. support for ‘civilian power’ and an unwillingness to engage with the military component of European power).
This analysis is rose-tinted, to say the least. It is pure speculation that Benghazi would have been ‘massacred’; why didn’t Gaddafi’s forces massacre the inhabitants of all the other rebel towns they captured? Secondly, the rebels are not poised to roll back Gaddafi. Militarily, they’re in a slightly better position than they were before 1973, but the stalemate still favours Gaddafi. Third, we still don’t have a coherent political-military strategy. It is instead, effectively, if we blow shit up good stuff might happen. Lastly, when this whole misadventure goes tits up, I think Germany will be vindicated.
Aaron: Perhaps it was ‘per speculation’ prior to 19th March. However, in light of the bombardment of Misurata, I think we can safely say that we foresaw the fate Colonel Gaddafi had in store for Benghazi. We also know that many of Gaddafi’s opponents have disappeared from the rebel towns he did recapture. Massacres do not have to be loud and noisy affairs. They can also be secretive, occurring with a knock on the door in the middle of the night.
I agree that we don’t have a political-military strategy, other than bombing in the hope that the regime will cave in. We’re also not bombing hard enough or broadly enough. The moment NATO took over seems to be the moment the whole operation started to go sour…
And I don’t think the Germans will be vindicated. Britain and France will not let that happen!!
A siege and a massacre are two different things. It is obvious Benghazi would have suffered a bombardment, ’cause it’d be under siege. That is different from the inhabitants being massacred on a genocidal scale, which was the dubious pretext for intervening. Also, we shouldn’t overlook the rough justice being meted out to Gaddafi supporters by the rebels – like arbitrary executions.
The problem isn’t not bombing hard or broad enough: only ingénues think you can win a war simply by blowing shit up. As a country, we don’t a coherent political-military strategy – linking policy to ways and means – and we don’t have one as a coalition. Libya is a textbook example of how not to get involved in a conflict, not unless you want to be stuck with a disaster. It combines the worst aspects of Iraq and Afghanistan, only on a smaller scale.
I also think it’s daft to imply Gaddafi supporting terrorism decades ago is cause enough for war. Daniel Korski couldn’t convince me on this, so I doubt you can. Gaddafi changed his ways, like Gerry Adams changed his ways; and we made beneficial deals with him. Not simply oil ones, but on WMDs. So, what other despots are likely to take away from our intervention is: we should acquire WMDs because then the West won’t invade us, like they did Libya and Iraq. Great for two months work!
Aaron: a siege and a massacre are for all intents and purposes exactly the same thing. Had Gaddafi’s forces been allowed to put Benghazi under siege, using the kind of weaponry they have, many civilians would have died (just as they have in Misurata). Whether that would have reached genocidal proportions (what does that mean, 1000, 10,000, 100,000?) is neither here nor there.
I disagree with your understanding of a political strategy: you seem to allege that such a strategy is pre-set. In military conflict, political strategy and ‘blowing shit up’ interact with one another. But, as I said previously, I agree with you that we need a better political strategy; the current situation seems a bit of a mess (to put it mildly). In this regard, Julian Lindley-French offers some prescriptions here.
I never said that Gaddafi’s support for state-sponsored terrorism was cause for war and nor do I want to convince you to the contrary. My support of the war hinges on three aspects:
1. To lay down a potent marker, a kind of European (or at least British-French) ‘Monroe Doctrine’, in the European Neighbourhood. I think we must show that we will not tolerate misbehaviour on the part of local rulers, and that we will use crushing force against them if they disobey us;
2. To force other European Union Member States to pull their weight militarily, fostering in turn a more activist strategic culture;
3. To assert British-French leadership and constrict the German attitude towards the use of armed force, particularly in an area of critical European interest. Forcing Berlin (and other capitals) to acknowledge that military power can and must be used, not only for static defence, but also for geopolitical engineering in the European Neighbourhood, is essential for the new European order, where the United States will be less and less involved.
In response to your last point, I think many dictators already know that – they can see the difference between the way North Korea and Iraq have been treated. But that has been the case since 1945; everyone knows that no-one will toy with a nuclear power. This means we must be willing to do whatever it takes to prevent dangerous or potentially unstable regimes from acquiring nuclear weapons, relating to all my points above.
One more consequence: a NATO airstrike on Saturday night killed Gaddafi’s youngest son Saif al-Arab and three of his grandchildren, a Libyan government spokesman said. Mussa Ibrahim said Saif al-Arab was a civilian and a student who had studied in Germany. He was 29 years old.