Britain’s power and pretensions in the modern world
Published on by James Rogers
In a new publication released today by the British-based Henry Jackson Society, Bernard Jenkin MP and George Grant – supported, in part, by a foreword by a former defence minister, the Rt. Hon. Bob Ainsworth MP – argue that, after the Strategic Defence and Security Review of Autumn 2010, the United Kingdom has reached a strategic ‘tipping point’ and that the decisions taken over the next couple of years could decide the future position and status of the country as a major power, perhaps indefinitely.
I strongly agree with them that the United Kingdom should retain a strong military, geared towards overseas ‘power projection’. I also agree that peace is not the ‘natural state’ of either the global environment or mankind; rather, peace is a form of political order, which is always brought about and then underpinned by the dominant powers – in our case, since the end of the Second World War, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. As such, Britain needs a grid of overseas military stations and British military power must be able to turn up anywhere on the world’s surface at short notice and be able to engage in the highest and most sophisticated of combat operations. Thus, the Royal Navy needs two aircraft carriers and the fighter-bombers to fly off them, a large flotilla of surface combatants, as well as a fleet of cutting-edge nuclear attack submarines; the Royal Air Force needs technologically advanced aeroplanes, missiles and unmanned combat aircraft; and the British Army needs expeditionary ground troops to project force across the land. Maintaining this capability shows the world – friend and potential foe alike – that Britain is willing to work with its allies to maintain the peace and that any attempt to usurp the prevailing order will be met with overwhelming power.
However, the politico-strategic aspect of Jenkin and Grant’s approach seems confused – and even lacking. The problem is – in reality – that in a world where giant new powers are rising very fast, it does not matter whether London spends two, three, four or even eight percent of Britain’s gross national output on military forces. Other countries, with far larger populations and industrial capabilities, will always be able to spend more. Britain’s expenditure must therefore be calibrated as part of a wider effort, which includes the countries on which Britain is most economically dependent – i.e. the other Member States of the European Union – and the countries with which it shares similar values (again, the rest of the European Union, but also Norway, Iceland, the Commonwealth, Japan and the United States).
Now here’s the rub: it is almost certain that as a rising China contests American power in East Asia, Washington will be forced to withdraw more and more of its military and political assets from other areas of the world – like Europe, Africa and the Middle East – to bolster its Asian-Pacific military posture. Britain’s own history shows that London was forced to do something similar approximately a century ago: as Wilhelmite Germany rose in Central Europe and began to contest British maritime supremacy in the North Sea, Whitehall was forced into signing alliances with France and Japan to maintain a favourable balance in the Mediterranean and the Far East, while the Admiralty was forced into withdrawing warships from those regions to counter Germany’s rapidly-growing High Seas Fleet – which was only a day or so’s cruising from being able to bombard London and Britain’s eastern ports.
The point being that – contrary to the misty-eyed fantasies held among many of Britain’s conservatives about the ‘special relationship’ – the United Kingdom will matter less and less to the United States as the twenty-first century draws on. This will leave London in an increasingly vulnerable position, particularly given Britain’s reliance on American military technology and intelligence assets. The British government should therefore move quickly – as Daniel Korski argues – to clarify whether it intends to raise military spending in 2015, so that there can be no misunderstanding about Britain’s willingness to maintain expeditionary armed forces and an inter-continental geostrategic reach.
Yet increased spending will still not be enough to overcome the strategic ‘tipping point’: in the progressively more multipolar world of the twenty-first century, mass, size and power will again become important. Thus, London must also work – with France – to bolster the European geopolitical constellation on which both powers will increasingly depend. Indeed, had Jenkin and Grant thought more about how Britain could boost the comprehensive power of the European Union – which, with five-hundred million people and a third of the world’s wealth, does have mass, size and, potentially, the necessary power to deal with the rising giants as an equal – their arguments might have been somewhat more convincing.
What if someone tried to contest this attitude?
@Zerberus: Thank you for your comment, although I’m not sure I know what you mean. Are you referring to domestic political forces, or foreign powers?
If the former, there are already lots of people who would like for Britain to become a small power. But they are wrong, and those of us who are more enlightened must argue them down. If the latter, the point is that it is through communicating determination – by maintaining capable armed forces – that London deters foreign powers from contesting British or European interests.
A bold (and, I think, correct) assessment that political power creates peace. However, for that reason, I suspect that the United States will rely more on the British as it shifts resources eastward. Given their close relationship, if Britain maintains its capacity, the Americans will welcome a reliable partner who helps pick up some of the global stability bill.
Certainly, this is the position, in Libya for instance, that the Obama administration has taken.
@RedWell: Of course the Americans will welcome a reliable partner who helps pick up some of ‘their’ global stability bill – everybody does. The problem here is that ‘global stability’ priorities in the American perspective are perhaps vastly different from the UK perspective. The UK and other EU Member States already pick up this bill extensively, and this comes as a surprise to most Americans. Europeans account for more than 50% of the world’s humanitarian aid for example. The American media is so profoundly anti European that they don’t even report on the vast contribution from Europe to American adventures in world affairs, as well as assistance in American disasters (like the Katrina hurricane). This of course does nothing to help counter the misconception in the United States that Europe is ‘sucking on America’s tits’. American officials are well aware of this contribution though, the problem for Britain and the rest of the European Union is that their strategic interests are never considered into the equation but this is rather an extra pillar under American adventures in the world.
This is of course very normal for America; it is a superpower and to safeguard its own interests which everybody does. I personally believe that: 1. There is no ‘special relationship’ between UK and USA; 2. The UK is getting the shorter end of the stick in its relations with the US.
I want to refer to the Diplomatic Cables that Wikileaks released to show what kind of a relationship this has become. I must admit that it deeply troubles me the lows to which Britain has sunk in its foreign relations. Britain’s leadership is desperately needed in the European Union to counterbalance Germany’s ‘hippy culture’ (low military budget, the closing nuclear reactors, dependence on Russia, etc.) since Britain has great support among the vibrant Northern European countries, like Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Ireland and could – along with France – be the catalyst in developing the European Union into a super power (which obviously the United States staunchly opposes). That will of course never happens while America can remove the European chessboard queen (the UK). Please read the whole thing. British officials are almost like children in their dealings with the United States and are almost pathetically paranoid and envy Sarkozy for being close to the US (Sarkozy, like French presidents in genera,l and rightly so unlike the UK Prime Ministers, think first and formost of their own and of European interests).
The cables touch on the ‘stability bill’ where they say:
So not only is Britain’s junior relationship so one sided, that they don’t wish that the US would maybe help Britain in its problems, but they are afraid that because the UK isn’t capable of providing the bill, but actually that the US would start distancing itself from the UK since they, temporarily, can not provide this funding.
In the end of the cable, the diplomat says:
And this profound weakness of the United Kingdom is for everyone to see in their relations with the US means the US can dictate British policy as it wants; the only thing they need to do is to show signs of diminishing weight of the ‘special relationship’ and London falls in line and starts attending to the Americans’ needs.
@RedWell: Thanks for the feedback. Yes, the United States will depend more on the British, but only if London can marshall the resources of the European Union. Europeans will have to take care of their own backyard, including even the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.
@Jon Gunnar: I’m not sure I share your view of the United States. Many Americans often seem contemptuous of Europeans, but they are normally the more rightwing ones. The moderate American establishment cares very much about European preferences, and they have been heavily integrated into American policy options over the past sixty years.
Well Im not talking about the American public; what they think is irrelevent. I work with many Americans – they are all rock solid poeple. Their position is molded by the American media and American institutions (American media today only reports on oversees matters what the State Department feeds them) which are both profoundly anti-European and I think nobody can protest that.
The question is wheather Europe wants to rely on itself or does it want to rely on how how American voters vote this or that term? American right wingers hate Europe, while left wingers in (centre right by European standards) want to maintain relations with Europe, but always on USA terms and for the benefit of the American empire. So even if Americans vote for Democrats, the European or British interest will never be taken into account.
The difference between Republicans and Democrats when in power is simply how hostile the relationship is publicly, but the relations are always on American terms for the American interest. It is humorous to see how a good chunk of the European public and leaders are now jumping on the ‘Obama bandwagon’ after an almost impossible relationship with the Bush administration. Lets not get confused: Republicans will be voted in to power again and hostile relations will continue.
If Europe were to be involved in a massive war in the next two decades, then as I have said, the United States would probably abandon its obligations as an ally. Hollywood would rewrite ‘treachery’ with two films about how Europeans are themselves to blame for their fate, and the funny thing is, they would be right: Europeans would be themselves to blame, in fact for not relying on themselves.
Everything the Republicans do to hurt the British or European interest will be forgiven after next democratic speech that touches on the importance of Europe in the American strategic interest. As I have said, it can be argued that Europe is occupied by the United States.
It is frightening to see advanced and intelligent European communities behaving like Greece under Roman occupation of divide and conquer.
I want to throw in a comment about how the United States directly tries to weaken Britain’s interest in the world post the Second World War: ‘If you look at post-1945 world politics, the United States has been consistently aiming to weaken Britain’s role in the world. (Americans might find offence to hear that and claim I’m anti-American, but if we leave such petty emotions aside, that is the truth). The Suez Crisis is obvious example. In this crisis, France realised that the Americans were not interested in an equal partnership or even sharing some roles in the global community. Britain decided it wanted more of the same and therefore started becoming closer to Washington, which is a mindblowing policy reaction to the Suez Crisis. The American focus on ‘bringing’ France back with, for example, higher positions in NATO, etc., while Britain has the appearance of accepting anything coming from Washington with a smile and thank you note.
The Falklands war was an interesting case. I’m still amazed that London didn’t demand American assistance. We were talking about an attack on British territory; Article Five wasn’t even mentioned in this respect (attack on one is an attack on all in NATO) but still the 11th September attacks where considered to be Article Five instance – an attack from Afghanistan (of course, the 7th July bombing in London didn’t touch Article Five). Imagine if someone attacked Hawaii and Europeans would not respond to help. We would hear massive uproar in the United States, bashing of Europe, boycotts, etc. The British were satisfied with the US ‘allowing’ them to reclaim the islands.
Grenada is also a case in point: very bold action from Washington, not even considering what Britain would think, and Reagan even lying to Thatcher claiming there was nothing going on (the same day the invasion was starting).
Things like the Italian military structures are a hurdle but Britain’s ‘junior mentality’ towards the United States is an even a bigger problem. Dismantling NATO would get us more than half the way of making EU a super power.
Britain would have a very bright future inside the European Union if it would be able face up to its role. An industry like Hollywood and world media is very much needed in Europe and there is only one place for that kind of industry to uphold Europe’s cause – in the United Kingdom. Europe can move mountains when it decides with government supplied aids (look at EADS) and jumpstart an industry to compete with the Hollywood, which would benefit Britain enormously and should not be hard to accomplish.
There is currently a power vacuum in the Middle East for the European Union to take advantage of but the time is running out. Europe needs bold actions to establish itself as a leading power, everything is in place, great infrastructure, quarter of the world’s military spending, and so on.
When I read my comments afterwards, I always come off like I am against friendly relations, partnership, or alliance with the United States. I am not.
But Europe, and especially Britain, are being taken advantage off. And this won’t change unless Europe shows strength.
If Europe manages to shoulder up and project itslef as serious superpower, than I believe the European Union and the United States will become stronger allies than they are currently. This in fact is almost inevitable when looking to the growth of developing countries, like China, India and Brazil (along with all the other developing countries).
Else I fear, fifty years from now, Europe will more resemble the Middle East or South America today. In a multilateral world, Europe MUST be one of the strong players.
@Jon Gunnar: Yes, both Europeans and Americans would benefit in the longer term if Europeans took a more mature and responsible international role, working with the Americans to uphold a liberal world order. It will come, eventually.
However, I must correct a few of your statements:
1. Britain did not receive direct military assistance from the Atlantic Alliance during the Falklands War because Article Five only applies to an attack on a signatory state within the North Atlantic area. That is why the United States did receive assistance after 11th September 2001 – because New York and Washington are in that area.
2. Britain did not need Washington’s permission to reclaim the islands from the Argentine junta. Britain unilaterally dispatched a large naval expeditionary force within three days of the invasion (with strong political support from France). Eventually, having realised that London was serious, Washington backed the British, and provided satellite and reconnaissance support during the conflict.
3. Britain did not request the Atlantic Alliance’s assistance after the 2005 London bombings because they were orchestrated by British citizens and not by foreign actors from overseas.
Okay. So these points you mentioned are valid points for lawyers to debate in a court of law. But the Falklands were a territory of Britain, right? Are you telling me it makes any difference if they are geographically in the North Atlantic or not? California is not in the North Atlantic either, nor is Hawaii, obviously. But the United States would be outraged if Europe failed to help them with an invasion in Hawaii.
Well of course you didnt need American permission to reclaim the islands but had the United States put itself against it, you would have backed down in a minute. In fact, the British were so used to depending on the United States that they even surprised themselves that they had a response of their own. This response would have fallen over itself if the Americans had have lent even a word of support for the Argentinians.
So Washington didn’t threaten to plummet the pound and put tariffs on British industry or boycott its products and so on when you needed to defend your territory and strategic interest, and in Britain this is considered to be support and a signal of good alliance?. Only one year later the Americans invaded Grenada which is (was before the invasion) in Britain’s sphere of influence.
The third point is reasonable: they were British citizens. But were the hijackers of the 11th September attacks Afghan citizens? Of course not. Most of them were Saudi, which – incidentally – doesn’t have any effect of Saudi relations with the United States. The only relations they had with Afghanistan was that they were trained there, and somewhere the 7/7 bombers were trained as well.
But this is all besides the point. Isn’t there an obvious pattern here to Britain’s strategic interests being brushed over by details of difference between American circumstances and British circumstances.
I have always said if every country in Europe was like France then the European Union would be a superpower today. Try to sell these instances of betrayals to the French and let’s hear them justify them with things like ‘the Falklands are not geopgraphically in the North Atlantic.’
And try to imagine the pressure the United States would put on Europe to declare war on Iran if it attacked Iraq or Israel, none of which are in NATO or in the North Atlantic. Same thing with North Korea attacking the South, or China attacking their own territory of Taiwan.
The message is: You do for us, we don’t do for you. And somehow the British officials are happy with that arrangement.
@Jon Gunner: I just don’t see this Roman-style relationship between the US and the UK.
Take the Falklands, which I think is a red herring for your argument:
1. it was 30 years ago and during the Cold War – not exactly the same geopolitical situation as today; more to the point;
2. The US did offer some help, but the real issue was that no self-respecting UK government would rely on the US or anyone else to protect its own territory from a third-rate military power.
More recently, both Kosovo and Lybia demonstrate that the US spends plenty of energy, material and money on ‘European’ problems.
Or consider satellite and naval capacity: clearly, the US spends more than all the European states together on these ‘common pool’ resources.
You mentioned international aid. Yes, Europeans spend more than the US, but US aid, overall, is more effectively spent because it is directed by one government.
This isn’t boosterism for US, necessarily, but a balance to the claim that the UK specifically, and Europe generally, gets much less from the US than the US provides for its partners.
This speaks to James’ point: if Europeans could coordinate on geostrategic issues, their capacity could eventually match the US. If achieved, this would leave the US with little leverage over London and other European capitals. Today, though, protecting European interests around the world (such as access to oil or stemming nascent Chinese expansionism rests as much on global US power and good graces as it does on European capabilities.
That said, which partner preferable for London: Washington or Brussels? If you’re sitting in 10 Downing Street, I’d say the former looks a lot more promising than the latter.
Well. Firstly, the fact that it happened during the cold war when UK was very much important for US stalemate against the USSR is even more telling. The fact of the matter is that the US military believed that UK would never succeed in its quest to reclaim the islands and policy makers were perfectly happy with Britan facing another humiliation of its imperial break up. The Argentinians with ever growing capability will sooner or later move to stake their claim on the islands again, and US response wont be any different. My hope is that EU defense establishments will be integrated well enough to help UK give the Argentianians a good beating again.
Obviously nothing has changed since this was. US is today providing the Russians with secrets of Britains nuclear capability to get the Russians to sign the new START treaty, which is the creme de la creme of Britains defense. Nothing could be more telling of how UK interests are been put aside by the US. All of this we are hearing now from wikileaks, which are revealing a quite different attitude and tactics from US diplomats towards the UK which one would never have guessed judging by the rhetoric on the surface about the special relationship.
The UK’s confrontation with Russia regarding the Litvinenko poisoning was of course totally ignored by the US and all I remember hearing from US officials was that the West had more interest in keeping good relations with Russia in terms of war on terror, bases to supply the coalitions in Afghanstian, human trafficking and cooling of tensions in the Caucusus, etc.
Is it more effectively spent since it benefits the US global interests more directly, than EU aid benfits lets say Italian interests directly, yes of course. But it is of course a load of rubbish that it is more efficiently spent, i.e. helping more people than EU aid, quite the opposite if anything.
Well thats almost like saying in a financial crisis, which partner should England’s Treasury prefer, the Bank of England or the Federal reserve. UK is part of what you call Brussels, Britain is not part of the United States. The question is if it wants to be part of a super power or be on the mercy of the good grace of the US, which I have demonstrated doesnt ever factor in Britains interest.
Look. American officials are out to do one thing, and one thing only, look out for American interests. That is what officials from every country are out to do. This hasnt anything to do with American people, most of them are rock solid and nice people. Most of them even like the British. The special relationship is a cultural thing, used by UK politicians to boost morale of the people, try to make them feel important and this can serve as a marketing gimmick for companies as well. But obviously, this has no bearing on American national interests and officials in the US, most of them, are not even aware of this special relationship, its a British political conjob.