Europeans and the South China Sea
Published on by James Rogers
Last week, I was interviewed by Iskander Rehman, the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on behalf of the South China Sea Monitor, which is published by the Observer Research Foundation – one of the leading think tanks in New Delhi. The subject of the interview was the economic, political and strategic interests of the European Union in the wider Indo-Pacific region, and how Europeans should interact with the region’s powers over the coming years.
Topics discussed include:
- The consequences of policies favoured by European isolationists, who think Europeans can stay out of Indo-Pacific geopolitics;
- Cuts in European military spending, and the potential consequences over the longer term;
- How and why the European Union can and should become more involved in the Indo-Pacific space;
- What the British and French – as the leading European military powers – can and should do to protect European interests and augment their allies in the region;
- How the sale of European arms to some Indo-Pacific powers could be beneficial to the wider peace.
• Please click here to read the report (see from page 10).
Good interview. Cheers.
Is the suggestion of an Indian Ocean ‘cutter’ force a reaction to the Black Swan concept from DCDC, or more generally an approval of the Hi-Lo navy structure adopted by the French with their low-end colonial frigates/corvettes?
@jedibeeftrix: My argument for a cutter force was from 2008, well before – I believe – the Black Swan sloops-of-war were even envisaged. As it happens, I had in mind something more along the lines of the United States and Japanese Coast Guards, which are, in effect, mini-navies. The Black Swan class comes close to my idea, but they’re not entirely the same as what I had in mind.
My idea was for several of the European Union’s Member States, who field – quite frankly – useless little frigates, with often outdated armaments, to scrap them and gradually construct a single, larger but less ‘war-ready’ class of vessels for constabulary operations (anti-piracy and anti-organised crime), disaster relief and humanitarian rescue operations. These cutters would be go-anywhere (i.e. expeditionary vessels with long range), lightly armed but reconfigurable for different operations, and levels of operation.
The bigger naval powers (i.e. the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands) would then have their vessels freed-up from mundane tasks, not only increasing burden sharing among Europeans, but also allowing the real naval powers to concentrate on higher-end assets and capabilities, not only now, but also in the future.
Ah, I see. Something along the lines of HDMS Absalon, if a little smaller? With the intention of providing the European Union with the capability to do constabulary duties complementary to NATO’s more warlike tasks.
Speaking as a Briton that sounds great, but whether the less capable nations will see it that way is another issue…
Everyone likes to see themselves as a sovereign actor capable of autonomy.
@jedibeeftrix: Maybe HDMS Absalon is a bit too big. I’m thinking more of something like the National Security Cutters that are used by the United States Coast Guard. Or the Shikishima class of the Japanese Coast Guard.
I’m not sure many European countries want autonomy. They just want to bury their heads in the sand and hope everyone leaves them alone.
In terms of UK commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, you may want to check out a piece on my blog site. I put up a long piece reviewing UK military commitments to South-East Asia, along with what else could be done.
It’s an interesting region, but we need to be realistic about what the UK can really achieve there.
@Sir Humphrey: Thank you for your comment. I read your pieces on the Think Defence site a while ago. I thought they were very good. However, I think I might disagree a little about your conclusions. While I agree that the current level of engagement is probably sufficient for the next couple of years, I think it will be inadequate in ten or twenty years from now. I also do not see military power as a tool to combat threats; that, for me, is its secondary role. Its primary role is to contribute to British diplomacy, or rather, to uphold British influence. Consequentially, more engagement can only be beneficial to British interests, rather than detrimental. Of course, if the engagement becomes overbearing, then it can be counter-productive. Yet with the ongoing rise of China I see little evidence of that possibility…
Britain should work closely with France to form much closer relations with Japan, Australia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and, crucially, India. I think we should also look more carefully at developments in the High North, particularly as the ice melts to make the Northern Sea Route feasible for several months each year.