The European Union was supposed to abolish internal geopolitics through the establishment of pan-European institutions predicated on ‘civilian power’. However, this has delivered Europeans into a nasty trap: we still rely on the United States to provide the ultimate guarantee for our security, through its nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers and air squadrons. Yet as America’s geostrategic focus shifts further away from Europe in response to events since 2001, what will Europeans do? In short, the continent’s main powers have been positioning themselves to fill the vacuum left by the United States. Unless the United Kingdom – of all powers – steps in to moderate this process in the interests of security, the European Union will be undermined, leading to general geopolitical disorder across our continent.

In some ways, this is a radical argument. For both America’s global decline and its complete departure from the European continent are not yet inevitable. But the fulcrum of world power does seem to be shifting from the Atlantic basin to the Indo-Pacific rim at an accelerating pace, and Washington’s geostrategic focus has continued to move in response. Europeans have not yet realised just how much this is going to affect the security of their own continental homeland and their worldview – least of all the British.

Four inter-related developments are starting to undermine the existing European security order:

1.) Russia is moving back into Europe. As American power is moved away from Europe and towards the Middle East and Central Asia today, and the Indo-Pacific rim tomorrow, a vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe has emerged. Moscow has been quick to re-establish its position in an area of historical geopolitical significance to its own well-being. It has used its position as an energy supplier and its military power to undo the Western backed post-Cold War reforms in countries like Georgia and Ukraine since the early 2000s. Russia is also attempting to ‘divide and rule’ Europeans through the pursuit of new partnerships with countries like Germany, France and Italy.

2.) Germany has sought to create for itself through diplomacy what it has failed to do again and again militarily: a pan-European penumbra where it forms the political, economic and cultural heart. With the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, Germany is finally surrounded by friendly, wealthy and increasingly dependent states, to which it can export its manufactured goods. Key to Berlin’s design is the co-opting of its vast eastern neighbour – Russia – into the German continental enterprise. Germany has sought to appease Russia by agreeing to block, albeit tacitly, the expansion of the European Union, and particularly the Atlantic Alliance, into regions where Russia once ruled, while simultaneously building up closer and closer economic and commercial relations.

3.) France – eager to keep up with Germany and freer of the constraints imposed in the past by American power – has sought to deepen its own relations with Russia. Paris has proclaimed 2010 the ‘Year of Russia’ in France and has sought deeper economic relationships with Russian energy corporations in a bid to keep up with its German counterparts. Equally, and critically, France has agreed to sell Russia advanced helicopter carriers (the Mistral class), which will greatly enhance Russian power in the maritime regions of the European Neighbourhood. This will inevitably undermine European influence in this zone, as well as those domestic forces fighting for democracy.

4.) The United Kingdom, once Europe’s leading power, has grown geostrategically lazy and complacent. This is born out of two misunderstandings: firstly, that a permanent European geopolitical settlement has been established; and secondly, that Britain’s most important relationship will always be with the United States. British leaders have placed all their eggs in a single basket, but this basket is close to breaking point. Indeed, their attachment to the Atlantic Alliance has led to the very things they have sought for so long to prevent: a nearly-helpless and de-militarised Europe that can add little of value to overseas NATO operations in places like Afghanistan.

In response to these developments, only one power has the means to keep the European train on the rails: the United Kingdom. Britain’s island geography means that it is Europe’s natural offshore balancer, the final arbiter of European affairs. In the aftermath of World War II, London had two objectives in order to maintain this role: keep Germany down and keep Russia out. This required an unbreakable alliance with the United States and France so that a formidable amalgamation of American, British and French power could be fused together to empower other democratically-minded states to uphold a favourable balance of power in the heart of Europe.

However, with the decline of American power, Britain will have to overcome its Atlanticist ‘default setting’. London must become more aggressive again: it must find a new means to maintain a balance of power within Europe that is favourable to Britain’s geopolitical position and national interests. There is only one way to do this: refashion the European Union under a common military policy and a reformed political architecture. The new British government must re-establish Britain’s power in mainland Europe: London needs to provide the vision and political will necessary to keep Europe orderly and united.

A reformed, British-led, European Union, with its own foreign and military policies, would bring Germany firmly back into the Atlantic system and coax France away from Russia. And in the face of new, large and unpredictable powers, it would empower the European Union to help maintain the wider liberal maritime trade system on which Europeans and Americans both depend for their prosperity and well-being.

• This commentary is a shortened version of our article, entitled ‘The return of European geopolitics: All roads lead through London’, which was published in the July edition of RUSI Journal. The above shortened version was published yesterday by Global Europe.

• Credit to Paul K for use of the comical map of European geopolitics.

Last year I co-authored a Briefing Paper for the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence on the existence and location of the European Union’s Member States’ overseas military installations. I have just put this into graphical format – please see the short video below:

Click here to view the embedded video.

As the video shows very clearly, these military stations cover the world. They could surely form the cornerstone of any future European Union ‘forward presence’ or ‘global posture’ as part of a yet-to-be maritime geostrategy. And so long as Britain and France hold onto them, these overseas military facilities could become even more of an asset than they already are for Europeans, especially if the world becomes increasingly multipolar and more competitive – not least because they straddle the European Union’s primary sea lines of communication.

Earlier this year, reports surfaced about Russia’s intention to procure a new helicopter landing platform. Such vessels form – alongside the aircraft carrier and the nuclear attack submarine – the core of any expeditionary naval fleet with global reach. The purpose of these ships is to overwhelm coastal defences in any littoral combat theatre and rapidly establish a permanent bridgehead on the ground.

But why would Russia want such a capability? After all, Russia’s continental geography has meant that it has long deployed landpower strategies to control its hinterlands. Granted, the Soviet Navy had a range of warships, but these never reached the level of size and sophistication of those operated by the British, French or Americans. And Russia’s maritime history has never been particularly noteworthy: the last time a Russian fleet set sail against a distant enemy, it ended in utter ignominy and ruin.

In short, the answer is: Georgia. In August 2008, the Russian military faced a series of logistical problems in deploying forces to their next door neighbour. What might have taken a maritime power only a couple of hours took the Russian Army a couple of days. And had the militarily inept Georgian Army blown up the Roki Tunnel (linking Russia to Georgia through the Caucasus Mountains), the Russians might have faced an even harder time. The Russian Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, Vladimir Vysotskiy, admitted as such when he justified the ships’ acquisition with the statement: ‘In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the [Russian] Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in forty minutes, not twenty-six hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore].’

This fits squarely in with Russia’s new geostrategy: the re-establishment of a sphere of influence, known in Russia as the ‘near abroad’. But this has proven tougher than the Kremlin thought, especially when countries in this so-called ‘near abroad’ have other options, including the pursuit of better relations with the Americans, Europeans, Turks, Chinese and Indians. The Rose, Tulip and Orange Revolutions, in Georgia, Kyrgystan and Ukraine respectively, backed by the Europeans and/or Americans, were in this sense a wake-up call for the Kremlin.

What is significant, however, is that Moscow’s eyes are set squarely on France’s Mistral class of helicopter landing platform, a technologically-sophisticated 23,000 tonne behemoth armed to the hilt with helicopters, missiles, guns and landing craft. Alongside their American and British equivalents, the Mistral is among the most powerful assault vessels afloat.

Yet due to fierce resistance from Russia’s shipbuilders and the country’s military-industrial complex, it was initially thought that such a move was unlikely. Surely the Russians would design and build their own helicopter carriers, just as smaller countries like Japan and South Korea have recently done? Not so: the Russian Admiralty revealed that the reports were correct and that Russia was indeed looking to procure a foreign vessel.

In itself, this move is revealing: the Russians lack the means and wherewithal to cost-effectively build their own helicopter carriers. What is even more surprising, however, is that France seems so willing to sell such a powerful and sophisticated vessel to a less-than-friendly country, which only last year threw its weight around in the Caucasus to much European disdain. After all, it was President Sarkozy who intervened on behalf of the European Union to gain a peace treaty, which the Russians later by-and-large ignored.

Late last month, the Mistral cruised to St. Petersburg for a Russian inspection. Unsurprisingly, this immediately alarmed the European Union’s Member States bordering the Baltic Sea, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia’s top military officer and other analysts stated that Russia’s possession of such a vessel would dramatically alter the military balance of power in Eastern Europe and tip it decidedly in the Kremlin’s favour. Likewise, Latvia’s defence ministry asked Paris to reconsider the move, which it saw as antithetical to the stability of the Baltic region.

Should the sale go ahead, France would profit considerably. It would make approximately €500 million from the deal, with a further €500 million for the sale of the license required by Russia for the construction of four more vessels. This would be a lucrative contract at a time of economic difficulty. But France needs to balance this against more long-term geostrategic considerations. Does France really want Russia to gain access to weapons platforms equal to its own and as many in number? If Russia acquires five assault vessels, only the United States and Britain would be left with a larger amphibious capability. How would this upset the balance of power in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, let alone further afield?

Providing Russia with such powerful naval weaponry is hardly going to enhance the European Union’s authority vis-à-vis Moscow in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Russia’s landpower advantages would be complimented with a formidable maritime capacity, the like of which the country has never had access to before. And given Russia’s unpredictable nature, there would be no guarantees against whom the warships would be used. The Russian Prime Minister has already said: ‘Whoever we buy it from, we will reserve the right to use it where and when we consider necessary.’

Equally, the European Union’s eastern Member States, already irked by recent Russian military exercises in Belarus – including simulated nuclear attacks on Polish cities – might become even more alienated from their western brethren. In turn, this could make them less conducive towards an enhanced European Union Common Security and Defence Policy, which France has long underwritten and tried to promote.

So rather than splintering the European Union with the pursuit of misguided cooperation with outside competitors, Paris should be aiming to harden the outer shell of the European Union with its fellow Member States. Selling Russia Mistrals is a mistake. In this sense, French philosopher, Andre Glucksmann, has put it aptly: ‘It is never too late to block a silly half-baked idea.’

• Credit to Wikipedia for picture.