For a long time, strategic studies and European studies appeared to mutually ignore if not disdain each other. In the context of the Cold War, strategic studies concentrated on the exercise of hard power as an instrument of foreign policy. Its natural focus was the military strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. Ignoring the European Economic Community, which except for the informal consultation mechanism of European Political Cooperation did not venture into the realm of foreign policy, let alone security and defence policy, came equally naturally. European studies, for the most part, did not look at the European Community as an actor in the field of security and defence either, turning instead to conceptualisations of the Community as a ‘civilian power’ or, more recently, a ‘normative power’.

Even when the European Union came into existence alongside the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to be followed by the European, now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), many scholars focused their efforts on trying to explain how these developments did not detract from Europe’s status as a civilian or normative power. Others, who thought these developments did just that, offered recommendations to put things right, as if somehow it would be wrong for the European Union to venture onto another path and become a fully-fledged actor in the field of security and defence. Strategic studies scholars meanwhile, if they could be convinced at all to allow themselves to be distracted for a moment and take a look at the European Union, did not take the tentative steps of the CFSP and CSDP very seriously.

The cause of this dichotomy is that both strategic studies and European studies scholars for the most part have a very narrow interpretation of the notion of strategy. Too often, strategy is understood as pertaining only to the use of military force to achieve political ends. If analysed through this lens, the European Union obviously is less well developed than other, unitary actors. Many scholars of European Union politics rightfully reject such an exclusively military-oriented approach for ideological reasons or because, less obviously, strategic studies is associated with an exclusively realist approach to foreign policy. Many strategic studies scholars on the other hand feel that the European Union is too insignificant an actor in the field of security and defence to merit their attention – although every classic author about strategy actually warns again underestimating the enemy.

However, military force, even coercive instruments in the broader sense, are but one of a much broader range of instruments at the disposal of a foreign policy actor. Admittedly the most dramatic tool, force, is also the instrument of last resort – an actor that had no other available instruments, would not last very long. As on the international scene, the European Union, a state-like actor, is much more than a military actor – like any other actor for that matter – no useful analysis of it can be limited to military strategy.

Even during the Cold War, the ‘traditional’ strategic studies perspective was too reductionist. A broader understanding of strategy is needed if the strategic lens is to be valuable in analysing and interpreting today’s world. If the notion of strategy has its origin in the study of the use of force as a tool of policy, today its application is much broader. Even without including the private sector, a logical application is found throughout all policy areas addressed by public authorities. Inspired by the tradition of public management or policy science, strategy can therefore be defined as a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the actor in question, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end.

Applying this definition to the European Union as an international actor, strategy refers to a comprehensive foreign policy strategy, covering all dimensions of external action, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. In other words: a grand strategy. A military strategy thus is no more – and no less – than a sub-strategy to the overall foreign policy strategy. The latter serves as a referential framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment, and guides the definition of the means – in case the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed.

Clearly, this updated definition of strategy can no longer be exclusively tied to the Realist school. Not that that ever made sense: a strategy inspired by a realist world view is just one option out of many that any international actor can follow. The 2003 European Security Strategy, with its focus on a preventive, holistic and multilateral approach, proves as much. As strategy concerns foreign policy in its entirety, civilian or normative power should not be seen as being in contradiction with the development of military power by the European Union, but as complementary dimensions of a single grand strategy. Furthermore, every theoretical school captures only part of the European Union. The strategic perspective by contrast offers a methodology rather than a theory, which can be applied regardless of the different International Relations schools and their proselytes, and which immediately yields policy-relevant results.

Thus, this modernised, broader definition of strategy allows for the useful application of the strategic perspective to the European Union, which has become an actor in its own right in all fields of foreign and security policy. It can no longer be ignored by strategists.

• Image: Salvatore Vuono and FreeDigitalPhotos.net

The European Union was supposed to abolish internal geopolitics through the establishment of pan-European institutions predicated on ‘civilian power’. However, this has delivered Europeans into a nasty trap: we still rely on the United States to provide the ultimate guarantee for our security, through its nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers and air squadrons. Yet as America’s geostrategic focus shifts further away from Europe in response to events since 2001, what will Europeans do? In short, the continent’s main powers have been positioning themselves to fill the vacuum left by the United States. Unless the United Kingdom – of all powers – steps in to moderate this process in the interests of security, the European Union will be undermined, leading to general geopolitical disorder across our continent.

In some ways, this is a radical argument. For both America’s global decline and its complete departure from the European continent are not yet inevitable. But the fulcrum of world power does seem to be shifting from the Atlantic basin to the Indo-Pacific rim at an accelerating pace, and Washington’s geostrategic focus has continued to move in response. Europeans have not yet realised just how much this is going to affect the security of their own continental homeland and their worldview – least of all the British.

Four inter-related developments are starting to undermine the existing European security order:

1.) Russia is moving back into Europe. As American power is moved away from Europe and towards the Middle East and Central Asia today, and the Indo-Pacific rim tomorrow, a vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe has emerged. Moscow has been quick to re-establish its position in an area of historical geopolitical significance to its own well-being. It has used its position as an energy supplier and its military power to undo the Western backed post-Cold War reforms in countries like Georgia and Ukraine since the early 2000s. Russia is also attempting to ‘divide and rule’ Europeans through the pursuit of new partnerships with countries like Germany, France and Italy.

2.) Germany has sought to create for itself through diplomacy what it has failed to do again and again militarily: a pan-European penumbra where it forms the political, economic and cultural heart. With the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, Germany is finally surrounded by friendly, wealthy and increasingly dependent states, to which it can export its manufactured goods. Key to Berlin’s design is the co-opting of its vast eastern neighbour – Russia – into the German continental enterprise. Germany has sought to appease Russia by agreeing to block, albeit tacitly, the expansion of the European Union, and particularly the Atlantic Alliance, into regions where Russia once ruled, while simultaneously building up closer and closer economic and commercial relations.

3.) France – eager to keep up with Germany and freer of the constraints imposed in the past by American power – has sought to deepen its own relations with Russia. Paris has proclaimed 2010 the ‘Year of Russia’ in France and has sought deeper economic relationships with Russian energy corporations in a bid to keep up with its German counterparts. Equally, and critically, France has agreed to sell Russia advanced helicopter carriers (the Mistral class), which will greatly enhance Russian power in the maritime regions of the European Neighbourhood. This will inevitably undermine European influence in this zone, as well as those domestic forces fighting for democracy.

4.) The United Kingdom, once Europe’s leading power, has grown geostrategically lazy and complacent. This is born out of two misunderstandings: firstly, that a permanent European geopolitical settlement has been established; and secondly, that Britain’s most important relationship will always be with the United States. British leaders have placed all their eggs in a single basket, but this basket is close to breaking point. Indeed, their attachment to the Atlantic Alliance has led to the very things they have sought for so long to prevent: a nearly-helpless and de-militarised Europe that can add little of value to overseas NATO operations in places like Afghanistan.

In response to these developments, only one power has the means to keep the European train on the rails: the United Kingdom. Britain’s island geography means that it is Europe’s natural offshore balancer, the final arbiter of European affairs. In the aftermath of World War II, London had two objectives in order to maintain this role: keep Germany down and keep Russia out. This required an unbreakable alliance with the United States and France so that a formidable amalgamation of American, British and French power could be fused together to empower other democratically-minded states to uphold a favourable balance of power in the heart of Europe.

However, with the decline of American power, Britain will have to overcome its Atlanticist ‘default setting’. London must become more aggressive again: it must find a new means to maintain a balance of power within Europe that is favourable to Britain’s geopolitical position and national interests. There is only one way to do this: refashion the European Union under a common military policy and a reformed political architecture. The new British government must re-establish Britain’s power in mainland Europe: London needs to provide the vision and political will necessary to keep Europe orderly and united.

A reformed, British-led, European Union, with its own foreign and military policies, would bring Germany firmly back into the Atlantic system and coax France away from Russia. And in the face of new, large and unpredictable powers, it would empower the European Union to help maintain the wider liberal maritime trade system on which Europeans and Americans both depend for their prosperity and well-being.

• This commentary is a shortened version of our article, entitled ‘The return of European geopolitics: All roads lead through London’, which was published in the July edition of RUSI Journal. The above shortened version was published yesterday by Global Europe.

• Credit to Paul K for use of the comical map of European geopolitics.

Now that Catherine Ashton has been appointed the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and that Herman van Rompuy has become the first permanent President of the European Council, a more fundamental question is: which foreign policy strategy will they actually pursue?

In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU has developed a grand strategy, embracing all foreign policy instruments and resources at the disposal of the EU and the Member States, but a partial one. The ESS tells us how to do things – in a preventive, holistic and multilateral way – but it is much vaguer on what to do: what are the foreign policy priorities of the EU?

The recent debate about the ESS, resulting in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, failed to answer this question. Offering little in terms of recommendations for the future, the Report creates an impression of unfinished business, which the EU can ill afford now that the Treaty of Lisbon will change the institutional set-up, NATO has launched a strategic debate to which an EU contribution is essential, and the EU risks being overshadowed by the much more purposive emerging powers or BRICs. A fully-fledged strategic review is in order to complete the ESS.

The first rule of strategy-making is to know thyself. Which values and interests should our grand strategy safeguard? Europe has a very distinctive social model, combining democracy, the market economy and strong government intervention. Preserving and strengthening this internal social contract between the EU and its citizens, guaranteeing them security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being, is the fundamental objective of the EU, both internally and as a global actor. The conditions that have to be fulfilled to allow that constitute our vital interests: defence against any military threat; open lines of communication and trade (in physical as well as in cyber space); a secure supply of energy and other vital natural resources; a sustainable environment; manageable migration flows; the maintenance of international law and universally agreed rights; and autonomy of EU decision-making.

To safeguard these interests, the EU must be a power, i.e. a strategic actor that consciously and purposely defines long-term objectives, actively pursues these, and acquires the necessary means to that end. Which kind of power the EU chooses to be, is also conditioned by the international environment. Marked by interpolarity (i.e. existential interdependence between an increased number of global powers), that environment is very challenging, but at the same time presents the EU with an opportunity to pursue a distinctive grand strategy.

In the absence of enemies and in view of the need for cooperation to tackle global challenges, the best way of defending our interests, in order to defend our model and values, is precisely to spread those values, because increasing the access of citizens worldwide to security, prosperity, freedom and well-being directly addresses the underlying causes of threats and challenges. The EU does not seek to coerce others into adopting it, not even merely to entice them through conditionality, but to convince them of the benefits of our model and values through practical cooperation on concrete issues, on the basis of shared interests and common challenges. Thus the recognition of the universality of our values can be gradually and consensually increased.

The approach which the EU has pursued so far is in line with this grand strategy, but practice has revealed a number of unanswered questions. How to avoid the clash between immediate interests and the emphasis on values? How to act vis-à-vis the emerging global powers and integrate them in the multilateral architecture? What to do when prevention fails and the threat or use of force is required?

The answers to these questions will determine the objectives which a complete grand strategy should define in more detail. The following priority areas require the identification of specific EU interests and the definition of concrete objectives, in order to direct policies and actions:

• The Neigbourhood: What is the desired end-state of the Neighbourhood Policy? Can only democracy create a consensual value-based community and thus safeguard our interests, or will democratization create such upheaval that our interests would be damaged? Only when our interests and red lines are clear can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued.
• Enlargement: A successful instrument so far, further enlargement is determining for relations with Russia and for the geopolitical position of the EU – and cannot proceed therefore without strategic debate.
• Regional objectives: A reluctance to discuss interests and join up the different European presences, from aid and trade to diplomacy, has undermined policies towards Central Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too, such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic need a thorough assessment of EU interests to determine whether or not our presence should be stepped up.
• Global and institutional objectives: The EU must sharpen its view about the multilateral architecture, reconciling reform with increased effectiveness of EU representation. That should inform a really strategic use of its strategic partnerships with the BRICs, the existence of which too often seems more important than their content.
• Conflict resolution and crisis management: A white book should define Europe’s ambition as a security actor. Regardless of whether in a specific case Europeans deploy under the flag of the European Security and Defence Policy, NATO or the UN: which types of operations must European forces be capable of, which priority regions and scenarios require intervention, and which is the scale of the effort to be devoted to these priorities?

It is not sufficient to have a more complete grand strategy – the EU must then also apply it. That requires an institutional follow-up structure. Now that the Treaty of Lisbon has entered force, the new High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission, supported by the External Action Service, should be formally entrusted with the implementation and development of EU strategy.

A grand strategy that translates the values on which the European social model is based into a pro-active and constructive foreign policy, aimed at concrete objectives: on that basis, with the right political leadership, the EU can be a global power.

• This article is based on an extensive report on European Union grand strategy, recently issued by the Egmont Institute in Brussels.

• Credit to Wikipedia for picture.

One may not be aware of it, but in its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) the EU has a grand strategy – but only a partial one. Grand strategy is about the long-term overall foreign policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making and guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – to be developed. By  nature, grand strategy has a broad scope, integrating all external policies, so in EU terms not just ESDP or even CFSP, but all relevant Community policies as well.

The ESS does part of this: starting from an analysis of the global environment, it outlines a holistic approach, putting to use in an integrated way the full range of instruments for external action, through partnerships and multilateral institutions, for a permanent policy of prevention and stabilisation. This is an important strategic choice, but it mostly tells us how to do things – the ESS is much vaguer on what to do, on our objectives. Of course, to be put into action a grand strategy must be translated into sub-strategies and policies, but the ESS has proved too broad, and Member States too hesitant to act upon it, to generate clear priorities.

A fully-fledged revision of the ESS is in order, to arrive at an effective grand strategy. The reasons are manifold.

When the December 2007 European Council mandated High Representative Javier Solana ‘to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it’, great expectations were raised. But the outcome was disappointing. The December 2008 European Council duly adopted a Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, deciding to leave the ESS itself untouched. This might have been acceptable, if the Report had offered concrete recommendations to improve implementation – but it did not, although recognising that ‘despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress’. Even though partly an issue of expectations management, in the eyes of many this outcome has once again confirmed the image of a hesitant and reactive EU, uncertain of its role on the world stage, internally divided and riddled by institutional blockages. The Report therefore cannot now be the end of the process – it must be the start of a true strategic review. Even if a full review was felt to be unnecessary in 2008, or if the timing – before ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon – was not ideal, now that it has been undertaken, it must now be brought to a good end.

The eventual entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon is another argument in favour of a review, so as to incorporate its innovations in the field of foreign and security policy. It should also be clear where the institutional ownership of a grand strategy lies and who is responsible for its implementation, an issue on which the ESS remains silent.

The negative perception of the strength of EU strategic thinking comes at an especially bad moment because it coincides with NATO’s decision, at its sixtieth anniversary summit in Strasbourg-Kehl on 4th April 2009, to develop a new Strategic Concept. In practice, NATO has lost its centrality: no longer the forum where Europeans and Americans discuss global challenges, the political centre of gravity has shifted to what are the Alliance’s two ‘pillars’, and to direct discussions between them – the EU and the US.

The Obama administration will certainly come to the NATO debate with a clear sense of what it wants, informed by a new National Security Strategy. If the EU as well arrives at the table with a revised grand strategy, Europeans have a unique chance to influence the debate: if each pillar within the Alliance first defines its own priorities, where they meet a truly shared NATO strategy can emerge. That NATO’s Strategic Concept is a function of EU and US strategy ought to be self-evident, as the former concerns only the military dimension of the comprehensive scope of both of the latter – just like the U.S. would never contemplate having NATO’s military strategy determine its grand strategy, neither should the EU. If however European allies join the debate continuing to pretend that the EU does not exist, the result can only be a one-sided Strategic Concept, which not reflecting a true consensus cannot be expected to generate forceful action either.

Recent events have shown that in some cases NATO, for political reasons, is not suitable as a framework for action either: deployment under the NATO flag was not an option in Lebanon in 2006 – although the EU eventually decided to reinforce UNIFIL rather than launch an ESDP operation; in the Georgian crisis of summer 2008, NATO was part of the problem rather than the solution, leaving the EU as the only available mediator, in the absence of strong US leadership; and even in the anti-piracy operations off Somalia starting end 2008 it has proved much more difficult for NATO than for the EU to interact with the countries of the region. This is not to say that NATO will never be the best option in a specific situation, but it proves that more leadership will – rightly – be expected from the EU, notably by the US, especially with regard to its neighbourhood and beyond. And leadership requires strategy.

Current EU strategic thinking does not seem up to that level of proactive engagement, which is all the more evident by contrasting it with the much more purposive action of other global powers, notably the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China). That is not to say that they are always successful in achieving their objectives – but at least they appear to have a clear idea of what their objectives are. Most of them do not regard the EU as a strategic actor, and are adept at playing off one Member State against the other, as the EU is only too good at ‘divide and rule’: by dividing itself, others rule. Even in the economic field the EU undermines itself. Every analysis points in the same direction: large, strategic players will dominate the future. If they want to safeguard their interests, Europeans have no choice but to act as a large, strategic player themselves, i.e. to act collectively and with a clear sense of purpose.

The EU has arrived at a stage where its own further development without strategy appears difficult. European integration has always been an open-ended process, into which policy fields were incorporated in a mostly ad hoc fashion, but that approach has reached it limits. Enlargement has reached the point where major strategic choices have to be made, for the accession of Turkey or Ukraine would substantially change the strategic picture. The difficulties surrounding first the Constitutional Treaty and then the Treaty of Lisbon, and the resulting institutional standstill, demonstrate the need for a new project, for a new narrative. A grand strategy is an essential part of that.

• Credit to the University of North Carolina for picture.