European Geostrategy | 18:26, 28 December 2009
By James Rogers
Earlier this year, reports surfaced about Russia’s intention to procure a new helicopter landing platform. Such vessels form – alongside the aircraft carrier and the nuclear attack submarine – the core of any expeditionary naval fleet with global reach. The purpose of these ships is to overwhelm coastal defences in any littoral combat theatre and rapidly establish a permanent bridgehead on the ground.
But why would Russia want such a capability? After all, Russia’s continental geography has meant that it has long deployed landpower strategies to control its hinterlands. Granted, the Soviet Navy had a range of warships, but these never reached the level of size and sophistication of those operated by the British, French or Americans. And Russia’s maritime history has never been particularly noteworthy: the last time a Russian fleet set sail against a distant enemy, it ended in utter ignominy and ruin.
In short, the answer is: Georgia. In August 2008, the Russian military faced a series of logistical problems in deploying forces to their next door neighbour. What might have taken a maritime power only a couple of hours took the Russian Army a couple of days. And had the militarily inept Georgian Army blown up the Roki Tunnel (linking Russia to Georgia through the Caucasus Mountains), the Russians might have faced an even harder time. The Russian Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, Vladimir Vysotskiy, admitted as such when he justified the ships’ acquisition with the statement: ‘In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the [Russian] Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in forty minutes, not twenty-six hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore].’
This fits squarely in with Russia’s new geostrategy: the re-establishment of a sphere of influence, known in Russia as the ‘near abroad’. But this has proven tougher than the Kremlin thought, especially when countries in this so-called ‘near abroad’ have other options, including the pursuit of better relations with the Americans, Europeans, Turks, Chinese and Indians. The Rose, Tulip and Orange Revolutions, in Georgia, Kyrgystan and Ukraine respectively, backed by the Europeans and/or Americans, were in this sense a wake-up call for the Kremlin.
What is significant, however, is that Moscow’s eyes are set squarely on France’s Mistral class of helicopter landing platform, a technologically-sophisticated 23,000 tonne behemoth armed to the hilt with helicopters, missiles, guns and landing craft. Alongside their American and British equivalents, the Mistral is among the most powerful assault vessels afloat.
Yet due to fierce resistance from Russia’s shipbuilders and the country’s military-industrial complex, it was initially thought that such a move was unlikely. Surely the Russians would design and build their own helicopter carriers, just as smaller countries like Japan and South Korea have recently done? Not so: the Russian Admiralty revealed that the reports were correct and that Russia was indeed looking to procure a foreign vessel.
In itself, this move is revealing: the Russians lack the means and wherewithal to cost-effectively build their own helicopter carriers. What is even more surprising, however, is that France seems so willing to sell such a powerful and sophisticated vessel to a less-than-friendly country, which only last year threw its weight around in the Caucasus to much European disdain. After all, it was President Sarkozy who intervened on behalf of the European Union to gain a peace treaty, which the Russians later by-and-large ignored.
Late last month, the Mistral cruised to St. Petersburg for a Russian inspection. Unsurprisingly, this immediately alarmed the European Union’s Member States bordering the Baltic Sea, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia’s top military officer and other analysts stated that Russia’s possession of such a vessel would dramatically alter the military balance of power in Eastern Europe and tip it decidedly in the Kremlin’s favour. Likewise, Latvia’s defence ministry asked Paris to reconsider the move, which it saw as antithetical to the stability of the Baltic region.
Should the sale go ahead, France would profit considerably. It would make approximately €500 million from the deal, with a further €500 million for the sale of the license required by Russia for the construction of four more vessels. This would be a lucrative contract at a time of economic difficulty. But France needs to balance this against more long-term geostrategic considerations. Does France really want Russia to gain access to weapons platforms equal to its own and as many in number? If Russia acquires five assault vessels, only the United States and Britain would be left with a larger amphibious capability. How would this upset the balance of power in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, let alone further afield?
Providing Russia with such powerful naval weaponry is hardly going to enhance the European Union’s authority vis-à-vis Moscow in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Russia’s landpower advantages would be complimented with a formidable maritime capacity, the like of which the country has never had access to before. And given Russia’s unpredictable nature, there would be no guarantees against whom the warships would be used. The Russian Prime Minister has already said: ‘Whoever we buy it from, we will reserve the right to use it where and when we consider necessary.’
Equally, the European Union’s eastern Member States, already irked by recent Russian military exercises in Belarus – including simulated nuclear attacks on Polish cities – might become even more alienated from their western brethren. In turn, this could make them less conducive towards an enhanced European Union Common Security and Defence Policy, which France has long underwritten and tried to promote.
So rather than splintering the European Union with the pursuit of misguided cooperation with outside competitors, Paris should be aiming to harden the outer shell of the European Union with its fellow Member States. Selling Russia Mistrals is a mistake. In this sense, French philosopher, Andre Glucksmann, has put it aptly: ‘It is never too late to block a silly half-baked idea.’
• Credit to Wikipedia for picture.
